



Opportunities at the Margins

The Jogi community in Mazar-e Sharif

Prepared for People In Need (PIN)



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Acronyms

AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
CSO	Central Statistics Office
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
IDKA	Independent Directorate of Kuchi Affairs
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
KIS	Kabul Informal Settlements
MMCC	Mobile Mini Circus for Children
MoCIT	Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MOLSAMD	Ministry of Labor, Social, Martyrs and Disabled
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMAK	National Multi-sectoral Assessment
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NRVA	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
PiN	People in Need
PRD	Department of Population Registration
UN-OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	US Dollar
WHH	Welthungerhilfe



Executive Summary

This study offers a glimpse into the life of the Jogi communities of Mazar-e Sharif, a window through which to view the daily challenges and minor successes that have been won through individual engagement despite structural discrimination.

The Jogis are a peripatetic group that is often categorized as “Jat” in Afghanistan. Peripatetic groups are endogamous (semi) nomads who are largely non-primary producers or extractors, and whose principal resources are derived through other human populations.¹ Their semi-nomadic migration patterns constitute a strategic resource through which they access different markets. The communities, however, are strongly marginalized both socially and economically. They lack access to legal recognition, which excludes them from land ownership, health care and education. While the Jogis share several problems with other groups such as IDPs in Afghanistan’s current urban context, they are burdened with social exclusion and structural discrimination through denial of ID-card ownership, which simultaneously regulates land ownership and access to basic services. IDPs potentially have a place of origin to go back to, and the legal means to obtain land and access resources as a citizen, the Jogis in contrast have neither of these options.

The group largely subsists through begging and daily labor, in which women and children play a role equal to male members of the households. Other sources of income are either underdeveloped or irregular, but offer potential for development. For instance, several Jogi households encountered in this study are employed by non-Jogi families in animal husbandry for which they are paid a set price per animal; Jogi women become cleaning ladies and maids in non-Jogi households; Jogi men are passionately involved in raising birds, especially quails, for singing and fighting games, which provides an irregular surplus; some select men engage in the most Afghan of all sports: buzkashi, as riders and jorchis (lit. town criers); and in one case, a Jogi musician has risen above the lowly station ascribed to his people by the broader Afghan society to achieve some degree

of fame. However, while these examples represent social and economic engagement between select Jogi and non-Jogi parts of the Afghan population, these examples are the rare islands of hope in a sea of socio-economic exclusion.

The marginalization of this group translates into a life of poverty and insecurity: the overwhelming majority of Jogi households are not able to accumulate any savings (85% in female and 73% in male-headed households). Only 39% have access to electricity and every second of those accesses the grid through illegal power lines spun from their neighbors (53%), compared to 91% of Mazar residents with regular access to electricity, 89% with direct access to the local power grid. 96% of Jogi households fetch water for daily use from public pumps and wells outside of their compound, walking 15–30 minutes (51%) or more than 30 minutes (34%) to get it.

Most prominently, none of the Jogi households covered in this study own any land, a factor, which they say, impacts every other level of their life. The ever-present threat of expulsion severely curtails the families’ future aspirations, primarily revolving around a desire to transition to a settled life and partake fully in Afghan society. As a socially marginal group the individual households benefit from carefully nurtured social ties to neighbors and surrounding communities - ties that are severed each time the households are forced to abandon their home base for good. While some households benefit from seasonal movement, they nevertheless return to the places they consider their homes and use the established infrastructure.

The legal status of the group is complicated, yet gives reason for hope. Generally, the Jogis did not have access to acknowledgment as an Afghan citizen through the Afghan ID card² (tazkera/tazkira). However, there has been some progress on this issue over the past few years, which implies that improvement of the situation is possible and has already been selectively available to some individuals in the Jogi communities. Several Jogis stat-

ed that they were able to get a tazkera in Kabul and Kunduz, and the Department of Population Registration (PRD) in Kabul stated that peripatetic groups such as Jogis are legally entitled to tazkeras. This knowledge, however, is very unevenly distributed among both Jogi households and officials of the regional tazkera departments. Lack of knowledge about the legal situation of Jogi communities or a mixture of indifference and prejudices among the various decision makers hinders the advancement of the basic rights of the Jogi community. The inclusion into the rollout of the e-tazkera process, however, could offer a positive development, once the process begins.

The educational status of the Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif is negatively affected by their de-facto legal nonexistence. While literacy rates for urban Afghanistan are already low, the education level of Jogi respondents was alarming: only 13% of the male respondents and 1,2% of female respondents had some basic literacy. These rates mirror literacy levels for pastoral nomads. However, these pastoralists are usually migrating through urban areas and only stay a short time in cities, which renders their illiteracy at least understandable. Jogi, on the other hand, spend the majority of their time in urban centers, which should, in theory, provide them with better access to education. But despite their proximity to educational infrastructure, most respondents have never had access to any educational institution (74%), with madrasa education being the most prevalent (14%). These numbers are striking, even for a country like Afghanistan with low literacy rates. In 92% of all households, no household member could read or write, despite a near unanimous interest in education.

The situation of the Jogi communities with their involvement of women in work outside of the home and their engagement in morally despised activities like begging find themselves historically as well as in the present day at the very margin of society. The legal situation of their difficult access to acknowledgment as Afghan citizens could be overcome if there

was either a conscious focus in the Afghan government or the international community to change this situation. Especially the case of the pastoral nomads (kuchi) highlights this: if it is possible in Afghanistan to establish extra rulings for one nomadic group that has historically belonged to more than one country, why can't there be additional rules, regulations and rights for other nomadic groups, too? If these rules would extend to other non-pastoral nomadic groups as well or if peripatetic groups were given an acknowledgment that included protection through rights, it could improve their standing and their actual situation considerably. The fact is, however, that the peripatetic groups in Afghanistan do not have the political lobby through strong spokespeople to speak up for them. It is thus upon the Afghan government or the international community to decide to support these groups and to ensure equal footing for any group residing and moving in Afghanistan.

References

¹ Rao, 1987, p.1.

² Hennion/Nicolle, p.5, p.34; UNHCR Universal Periodic Review: Afghanistan, p.3, 7; UNHCR-Richtlinien zur Feststellung des internationalen Schutzbedarfs Afghanischer Asylsuchender, 2013, p.78; IWPR, ARR Issue 362, 25 May 10.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background of the study

Very little is known about the Jogi community in Afghanistan. While not an ethnic group per se, they are considered to be a so-called peripatetic group, in Afghanistan called Jat, who are generally characterized by their exclusion from the rest of Afghan society, their semi-nomadic lifestyle and their unusual sources of income, heavily reliant on women begging. Their exclusion can be categorized into two forms: the community is systematically denied formal documentation by the government (tazkera), meaning that its members are not able to access services such as health, education and landownership, while the general Afghan society discriminates against them due to the fact that women are often major bread-winners in the household.

Academically, Jogis are considered to be peripatetic nomads, who use movement strategically to access different economic resources.³ In the specific case of Afghanistan, no studies were conducted up to the 1970s when the anthropologists Asta Olesen and Aparna Rao made forays into the field. Until 2004, Aparna Rao published extensively on Afghanistan's peripatetics⁴, despite the fact that her material was gathered in her field research from 1976-78.

Objective 1

Build and update knowledge on the socio-economic, educational and legal profile of the Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif



Objective 2

Identify and analyze the developmental needs and barriers to access basic services. Evaluate past engagement of NGOs with the communities



Objective 3

Propose recommendations to improve the situation of Jogi communities through short and long-term strategies



^ Data collection for household survey with electronic tablets

Similarly, Olesen's information is based on her fieldwork stay prior to the Saur Revolution of 1978.⁵ Over the past four decades, perpetual warfare, displacement and the resulting ruptures in the fabric of Afghan society makes the need for ethnographic research on these groups even more urgent. Since 2001, there has been only one survey – published in 2011 – by Samuel Hall Consulting, commissioned by UNICEF with the focus on 'out-of-school children' and social marginalization of Chori Frosch and Jogi communities.⁶ This report has been the only official study dedicated to the peripatetic communities in Afghanistan over the past decade. But fast-paced urban changes in Afghanistan over that same time-frame beg the question: how have the communities fared during a period of such intense realignments in Afghanistan's socio-political landscape and what are their needs in terms of education, documentation, health and WASH, food security and livelihoods?

People In Need's Urban Poverty Programme is currently working with the 70 households of the Jogi Community in Mazar-e Sha-

rif, providing them with kits and training on urban agriculture (kitchen gardening), with the aim of improving dietary diversity and diversifying the income, eventually leading to increased resilience. PIN commissioned this study to learn more about the community and how to better support them sustainably.

1.2. Project Description

This study takes an in-depth look at the extent of marginalization of the Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif, and provides a basis for future programming and advocacy for these communities. The study identifies and analyzes the development needs of the Jogi communities in Mazar, and the limitations faced in the sectors such as education, documentation, health and WASH, food security and livelihoods. Furthermore, the study aims at outlining the most effective combination of short and long-term strategies for improving the status, livelihood conditions and access to services for the Jogi communities in Mazar-e-Sharif.

1.3. Methodology

Desk-Based Review

The research for this study began with a desk-based review of secondary literature on peripatetic groups in Afghanistan and the broader region, as well as related contextual material on urban poverty, marginalization, and informal settlements. This review included academic sources, official reports, published and unpublished studies, documentary sources, as well as the indicators used in the programming of PIN and other stakeholders. Such a desk review offered an overview of the available and published information, and a base for later data collection and analysis.

Fieldwork

The desk research was supplemented by key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and a quantitative household survey, which took place from 24rd May to 20st June in Mazar-e Sharif, with an interview week in Kabul from 4th to 11th June. Previous research conducted by the author, such as an interview series from 2013/14 among Chori Frosch households in Kabul, offered additional information to contextualize the data.⁷

The author conducted qualitative, semi-structured key informant interviews with governmental authorities and commissions, such as

- Ministry of Interior (Mol)
- Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA)
- Ministry of Labor, Social, Martyrs and Disabled (MOLSAMD)
- Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MoCIT), Department of E-Tazkera
- Department of Population Registration (PRD)
- Independent Directorate of Kuchi Affairs (IDKA)
- Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)

Additionally, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the following informal leaders and individuals:



^ Discussion with male respondents in Zahiruddin Camp

- Jogi elders and leaders
- Neighbors of Jogi communities
- NGO employees working directly with Jogi population or with IDPs (such as WHH, MMCC, NRC and Skateistan)
- UN-agencies (UNHCR, UN-OCHA, etc.)
- Scholars and experts, both Afghan and internationals

Focus Group Discussions

After initial introductory interviews in the Jogi communities, a group of PIN employees (one male, one female) who were trained by the author in interview techniques and FGD-methodology, conducted the Focus Group Interviews in four different Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif. The FGDs included male and female groups of adults, groups of Jogi community leaders, and

focus groups with Jogi children to gauge their educational, family-health, economic and socio-political prospects from a variety of perspectives. The Focus Group Discussions were recorded and later on translated and transcribed.

Quantitative Household Survey

The qualitative sections of the survey were supplemented by a quantitative household-survey in 220 households. The household-survey was designed with PIN’s urban poverty-household survey as a baseline.⁸ The assessment consisted of a detailed household questionnaire designed specifically for the urban context, looking at key indicators of urban poverty, including: household profile, housing, water and sanitation, nutrition, income, expenditure, credit, access to social services and mi-

gration background. For direct comparison, this report also uses the resilience score that was developed by PiN based on cut-off points adapted to the Afghan context. Additional questions were added to clarify the situation specific to Jogi communities and to offer a more detailed assessment.

The household survey was based on a questionnaire of 150 mainly closed questions administered exclusively in the Jogi communities and consisted of a comprehensive sample of 220 households made up of 1000 individuals. The most up-to-date list of Jogi households available through PIN from spring 2015 was used and over the survey process, that list was revised to reflect changes in community composition largely due to an influx of new households. The household survey was administered by five Afghan enumerators (male and female), who used electronic tablets to collect the data.

Constraints and Limitations

Seasonal Availability and Security Situation

Some parts of the survey had to be conducted along a different time-line than initially envisioned due to the changing security situation. The time for the household survey, for instance, overlapped with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. In this time several families of the Jogi community were gone to Kabul to find a better climate and more favorable working conditions, which affects not the overall sample, but specifically the questions relating to nomadic and migratory practices. Additionally, the fighting in several northern provinces brought an influx of IDPs into Mazar-e Sharif and also into the camps. The enumerators attempted under the supervision of the author to ascertain the identities and community connection of the respondents, but the situation was very fluid and there are some accounts of Jogi families among the respondents who do not usually reside in Mazar-e Sharif, and who could simultaneously be counted as IDPs.

Perception of foreign Aid-Agencies

The Jogi community has been subjected to numerous surveys from different aid agencies in the past. From their perspective, there is an imbalance in the scale of NGO interest in them compared to positive impacts on their community. A common phrase heard during the course of the fieldwork was: “they come, ask questions, take pictures and nothing ever happens”. This anger, however, was counter-balanced by the wish to receive support if it is offered. In some cases, the researchers were perceived by community members as compiling a list of future beneficiaries, as opposed to assessing the overall needs of the community. This led to occasional instances in which individuals used the opportunity as a way of listing their personal grievances, particularly health issues, for which they were seeking redress. Some of the answers to the survey might therefore be biased in this regard, which was attempted to counter-balance this tendency with comparing the answers with non-NGO connected contemporary research of peripatetic and non-peripatetic groups.

1.4. Structure of the Report

This report is divided into five chapters and structured as follows.

The first section introduces the research context and the objectives of the study. It gives a detailed overview of the methodology used for the study as well as the limitations and challenges faced during the time of conducting the study.

The second chapter offers an introduction into the academic debate of peripatetic groups and how the Jogi are situated within this debate. It furthermore defines and identifies the Jat communities in the Afghan context and offers a brief historical overview with a focus on the Jogi communities.

The third section presents the findings of the fieldwork. It draws on the data from the household survey, Focus Group Discussions and interviews, and offers an in-depth analysis of the extent of marginalization of the Jogi community in Mazar-e Sharif. This section provides an overview of sectors such as education, civil documentation, health and WASH, food security and livelihoods. Additionally it looks in section four into indicators for the community’s resilience and their coping mechanisms. In order to contextualize the data, the findings will be compared with the socio-economic profile of the surrounding non-Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif.

The last section of this report will concentrate on recommendations on possible diversification of income activities for future projects and suitable lobbying avenues for improving the communities’ social status.



Introduction and methodology

History of Peripatetics & special focus on Jogis



Presentation of Findings, Household Survey, FGs and Interviews

Recommendations



References to Chapter 1

³ Rao, 1987; Rao/Berland, 2004; extra volume of 'Nomadic Peoples' in 1986, 21/22, 'Peripatetic Peoples'. Rao/Casimir, 2003.

⁴ Rao, 1979, 1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1987, 1988, 2003, 2004. Writings from the years 1981, 1985, 1986(c) were not accessible to me and are listed here for future reference and to portray Rao’s far-reaching body of work concerning peripatetic groups in Afghanistan.

⁵ Olesen, Asta. 1982. The Musallis – The Graincleaners of East Afghanistan. Afghanistan Journal, Jg.9, Heft 1. Wiesbaden.; Olesen, Asta. 1985. The Sheikh Mohammadi – A Marginal Trading Community in East Afghanistan. FOLK, 27: 115-47. Copenhagen.; Olesen, 1994.

⁶ Hennion, Camille, and Hervé Nicolle. "Jogi and Chori Frosch Out-of-School Children/ A Story of Marginalisation." Samuel Hall Consulting for UNICEF, 2011.

⁷ Research Master Thesis at Leiden University, Annika Schmeding, "Who’s the real nomad in Afghanistan? Socio-political status, legal rights and the differences between peripstetic and pastoral nomads", unpublished.

⁸ Samuel Hall for PiN, "Urban Poverty Report/A study of poverty, Food insecurity and Resilience in Afghan Cities", see: <http://samuelhall.org/REPORTS/DRC%20PIN%20Urban%20Poverty%20Report.pdf>

2. Definition and History

2.1. Definition

The “Jogi” population is in the scholarly literature categorized as a “peripatetic” group. This section of the report takes a closer look at the definition of “peripatetic groups” both in general and in the Afghan context.

2.1.1. The category of peripatetic people

Peripatetic groups are defined as “endogamous nomads who are largely non-primary producers or extractors, and whose principal resources are constituted by other human populations”.⁹

The “basic elements...of peripatecism are labor, customers and skills/goods”, and while their strategy lies in “combining spatial mobility and non-subsistence commercialism”, the “degree of spatial mobility”¹⁰ can vary between different communities. The people belonging to these groups are therefore not vagrants, but (formerly) semi-nomads. Vagrancy denotes irregular patterns of travel that are uncoordinated with social or economic factors, a lack of a place to live and a lack of a specific source of subsistence,¹¹ all of which does not tailor with the characteristics of the groups described. In contrast to vagrancy, the Afghan peripatetics’ reasoned and planned mobility is part of their adaptive strategy to access different markets and customers.¹²

Some authors furthermore cautioned against lumping these communities generically together with ,gypsies’¹³: calling Afghan peripatetics ,gypsies’¹⁴ due to characteristics such as non-herding and not exclusively foraging nomadism would be to mistake a “clear case of analogy...for homology”¹⁵. European and North-American ,gypsies’ are “historically and culturally closely related...[and] claim to be Rom”¹⁶ communities, which is not the case for peripatetic groups in Afghanistan. They rather claim different ancestry and ethnicities and are not all historically and culturally interrelated. Their position in society is, however, an example par excellence for other peripatetic groups

worldwide, as they have a low, often despised status in society¹⁷ and are seen as rather liminal groups that are known to the Afghan society, but are not fully accepted within it.

2.1.2. The term Jat in Afghanistan

In spite of the migratory aspects of the life of peripatetic groups, they are not called ,nomads’ [kuchiyan/pohwinda] in Afghanistan, but ,Jat’. The term ,Jat’ is of Indian origin¹⁸ and “groups known as Jat, Jaat, Jath, and Zut live (or lived) in India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria”.¹⁹

,Jat’ is the cognitive category for peripatetic groups in Afghanistan and does not denote a single group, but several peripatetic communities. These communities, however, reject the term ,Jat’ for themselves due to its pejorative/derogatory connotations but might label other groups as ,Jat’.²⁰ The vague and negative image of these Jat-groups covers a spectrum from being bad Muslims or nonbelievers, to being dirty, loose or associated with prostitution, aggressive behavior and crime, to child abduction and necrophilia.²¹ Additionally, they are associated with a foreign background of Indian origins,²² which was one of the main features referred to in almost all interviews with non-Jogis that revolved around the groups’ current political-legal status. This foreign background is associated furthermore with physical features such as dark skin complexions. All in all, “Jat” used to be generally applied as an expletive:

“If you want to degrade a person or humiliate them in Afghan society, you make a connection between their family and ‘being Jat’ or ‘like Jat’ or Jogi. These people are being demonized and dehumanized through terminology. There is a general perception in Afghan society that these people eat children and that they know no boundaries, in other terms that they live incestuously. As an out-group that lives in isolation, other people don’t have exposure to their lives, but these stereotypes are also used in a conflict for resources.” (Rohullah Amin, Interview)

These insults are often also directed against female relatives if their appearance or behavior is considered careless.²³ This combination of alleged deviant behavior coincides with the different position of women within groups identified as ,Jat’: most of these peripatetic groups practice a different gender division of labor in which women are either the main bread winner outside of their homes or are equally involved in earning an income. As Rao noted in the 1980s:

“In a predominantly Islamic society an unveiled woman unaccompanied by a male relative is outrageous enough. But the ,Ġat’ woman went even further; she left her parental or conjugal home each day to peddle her wares and returned home with her earnings. She was thus a manifest challenge to existing norms and values. Similarly, the ,Ġat’ man who stayed home to work at his craft, train animals, look after his children and do part of the housework in his wife’s absence was frankly reversing the traditional role concept prevalent in the greater part of Afghan society.” (Rao, 1986(a), p.279f)

While it is important to note that much has changed since then in Afghanistan’s economy, with women in the work force in both rural and urban areas, the markets are still male-dominated with mostly only men as sellers. Peripatetic women are still today functioning as boundary and status makers of these groups. The fact that women were working or begging in the bazaars/ markets outside their houses and in non-protected areas, was referred to as one of the characteristics of these communities.²⁴ Rao even goes so far as to identify the behavior and activities of peripatetic women as “the key to this categorization and identity”²⁵ of “Jats”.

Jat is thus a classificatory term, which carries with it many, mainly negative, connotations.²⁶ The different groups, which fall under this term differ in economic subsistence, history, societal ties and cultural traits.

2.1.3. Different peripatetic Groups in Afghanistan

The Jogi are just one group among several others who are subsumed under the label of “Jat” or, more neutrally, peripatetic groups. In the 1970s and 1980s several other peripatetic groups lived in Afghanistan and were described by ethnographers. Among them were

- the Shaykh Mohammadi pedlars, who claimed ancestry to “Sheikh Mohammad, reverently referred to as Sheikh Rohani Baba, the spiritual father”²⁷ and who made profit through exploiting price differences of certain products in different regions such as the markets of Kohistan, Nuristan and Laghman.²⁸
- The ,Gorbat/Ghorbat/Ġorbat’, also known as Chighalbaf or Ghalbelbaf²⁹, which was a Shiite community that was said to have migrated originally from Iran to Afghanistan. The men were mainly involved in manufacture and door-to-door sale of sieves and tambourines, the women sold cloth and haberdashery, older women were said to practice bloodletting.³⁰
- The Shadibaz/Sadiwan who peddled trinkets and performed with monkeys, hence their name which literally means ,fun player/maker’ in colloquial Persian.³¹
- The Jalali are described as either “professional secular beggars”,³² in contrast to faqirs³³ or, when better off, peddling fruits and haberdashery from door to door as traders. Some men “nomadized as musicians playing the harmonium and drums...[or] had monkeys they trained to dance and perform tricks”³⁴.

While there is no up to date information on any of these groups, two other peripatetic groups in Afghanistan, the Jogi as well as the Chori Frosh communities, have been described in both ethnographic accounts forty years ago and in present reports.

The focus of this report lies on the Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif, however, it should be noted the Jogi communities are in a structurally similar situation as the Chori Frosch communities that can be found nowadays in Mazar-e Sharif, Kabul and



^ Chori Frosh Woman in Kabul with customer

Jalalabad. ‘Chori Frosh’ means in Dari literally ‘bracelet sellers’, just like their Pashto equivalent ‘Bangriwal’ or ‘Bangudifrush’.³⁵ Chori Frosch communities researched by the author in 2013/14 in Kabul were fluent in both Pashto and Dari next to their native Hindko. The name of the group already tells about their economic base: the women sell glass bracelets (bangles, chori) in the markets and from door to door. They earn the main income for their families. The men contribute through daily labor, collecting and reselling plastic or showcasing trained monkeys. While both groups, Chori Frosh and Jogi communities, occupy as peripatetic groups a similar socio-economic position in Afghan society, the research showed no social network between these communities.

2.2. History

Historical knowledge on these groups is scarce to say the least. This is partly due to their academic marginality up until today, partly because the people themselves are rather vague or secretive about their origins, - for a variety of reasons. Today one of the causes of not revealing community history might be due to an attempt to overcome the stigma of ‘not being an Afghan’ in the eyes of other Afghans. However, some points can be deduced from anthropological writing in the 1970s, the author’s interviews and participant observation, supplemented with cross-links to historical developments in Afghanistan and the wider region (Central and South Asia). Most of the researchers

working with peripatetic groups find it difficult to disentangle historical accounts and legendary stories of origin.³⁶ In a culture largely reliant on oral history, and especially with a marginalized group whose history has not been explicitly recorded in national history writing, both accounts can tell us more about the current and past position of these groups.³⁷ However, for brevity and clarity this report will focus on the aspects directly retold by the Jogi community or recorded by other ethnographers in connection with Jogi groups.

The timing of first entrance into Afghanistan seems to lie around 120–170 years ago. Based on oral accounts, from both the 1970s and post-2001, several authors have arrived at this conclusion.³⁸ Reasons for leaving their original homeland are varied for the different peripatetic groups: successive droughts, famine conditions, better economic prospects through nomadic trade or continued blood-feuding that drove families out of their place of origin.³⁹

Another important aspect when considering migration at that time and trans-national nomadism is the characteristics of borders as such in the region in the past. Boundaries used to be rather flexible frontiers, spaces of transition and differing zones of control than in- and excluding lines of control. This fluid situation started to change only with the nascent nation states.⁴⁰ The passes between Afghanistan’s valleys and the valleys beyond towards Central and South Asia have been “well-travelled international byways of commerce. They were already old when the Silk Route caravans were young.”⁴¹ The Amu Darya for example had always been a natural demarcation and was officially acknowledged as a border since the mid-18th century and confirmed again in 1873 between Russia and Afghanistan.⁴² How border-policies affected whole communities can be seen in Rao’s account that she collected from a Jogi-community:

“Informants said that their ancestors migrated back and forth between Boxara and Afghanistan: ‘There were in those days no

individual property rights and so wherever we went we cultivated unused land. But when Mir Alam Xan became King of Boxara and the border was sealed, our fathers found themselves on this side without any land.’ It is hard to say to what extent these statements correspond to historical reality; however, in 1902 Syed Mir Alam Xan was declared Amir of Boxara by Czar Nicolas II and some fifteen years before this the northern border of Afghanistan was officially demarcated. In 1921 the Xanate of Boxara fell to the Soviets and the Amir fled to Afghanistan; this sparked off a wave of immigration from Central Asia into Afghanistan and several Ġogi families were among the immigrants.”⁴³

This recollection corresponds with the accounts given in the individual interviews during fieldwork for this study:


“In the past we belonged to Bukhara. Maybe my grandfather was even born there. Not sure when he came here. When the Russians occupied Bukhara, we escaped to here from the war. They had to cross the river at that time, so many of them died. We used to have land there, at least some, and our own houses. But when the Russians attacked we left everything. That’s why people think we are nomads [used word: Kuchis], we don’t have any land or don’t belong here. When we live on the land of others, we deserve to be called kuchis, because it’s not our land.” (Man, 65 years, Zahiruddin)

“My grandfather was a mullah in Bukhara, Mawlawi Jabar, his father was Abdul Rashid. About 150 years ago he came here, when the Russians and Muslims fought. 600 families are still there.” (Man, 56 years, Qali Haeri Camp)

2.2.1. The recent community past

Some more recent ethnographic descriptions give an idea of what life was like for peripatetic communities in the 1970s: In general, authorities seemed to have tolerated different per-

Where were you during...



ipatetic groups “as long as they remained inconspicuous”.⁴⁴ The peripatetics could camp on the fringes of cities, but had to obtain permissions from the local police to do so. They had to register their group and appoint “a responsible ‘headman’ as well as a settled person to guarantee their good behaviour... If

anyone committed any violation of law, the maliks were responsible for summoning them.”⁴⁵ Peripatetic groups were therefore under constant surveillance through authorities. They were “less subject to taxation”⁴⁶ and had the nominal opportunity to obtain identity cards, which came yet to another cost:

“While possession of an identification card was mandatory for men, it required registration of a permanent address, which automatically meant being drafted for two years’ national/military service. While their duties towards the State were well-defined, the itinerants’ rights were less obvious, and in all official encounters they were a priori considered less respectable and reliable than settled people.” (Olesen, 1994, p.28)

During the period of war and conflict that ensued between the 1980s–2000s, peripatetic groups chose different strategies: All of the Chori Frosch groups the author spoke to in Kabul during research in 2013/14, had flown to Pakistan and according to their own account it was an economically difficult time. Some of them remained in IDP camps while others put up camps outside of Peshawar in an independent place. Anecdotal evidence points towards attempts of mujaheddin leaders to mobilize Jogis to fight for them against the Russians: “Many of the Jogis have ID cards from political parties from the mujaheddin. They received them in Iran or some in Pakistan. There is one community in Chahr-e Kambar, who still have the mujaheddin ID cards from 30 years ago. They got these IDs considering themselves as Afghan, though they did not join the mujaheddin to fight the Russians, they considered themselves loyal to the mujaheddin, because they were living in the refugee camps.”⁴⁸

“We have lived here for about 10 years now. Before we were in Shibergan and in the Taliban time we stayed in Puhl-e Kumri. Before that we were in Achtshar, recently we have been staying here.” (Man, Zahiruddin Camp)

“12 years ago, we lived in the Quetta area for two years. It was not much different from here. There was a rich man and he let us live there for free. Only me, my uncle and my cousin Jamil were there. I worked daily labor jobs in the market. You’ve been to Quetta, it’s a bit colder there than here and therefore it was easier to work there. I came back when the new regime [Karzai government] came. The Pakistani government forced us to go back. They came and destroyed our houses. They did that with all the houses where more Afghans lived to push us out.” (Man, Zahiruddin Camp)

The Jogi communities that are now residing in Mazar-e Sharif mainly stayed in Afghanistan during the Soviet time (67,3%), the Civil War times (80,5%) and the rule of the Taliban (84,1%). Over 10% sought refuge in Pakistan (15,5% during Soviet time, 10% during the Civil War, 12,3% during the Taliban time), while nearly none of the respondents claimed to have resided in Iran (only 0,5% in Civil War and Taliban time) or Central Asia. This runs counter to common stereotypes linking this group to Central Asia, where they are suspected by other Afghans to still have strong community ties and where – given the circumstances – it might have been natural to flee to.

“During the Soviet time we lived behind Naar-e Shahi. There was no peaceful time. So many people died and the dogs ate the dead in the street. Sometimes six or seven people lay in the street. Behind this school that you see there were hundreds of people who died. We never took part in fighting, so no one of us died. At that time we were assistants for cultivating plants and building houses. (Man, Zahiruddin Camp)

“We came back 5 years ago from Pakistan. We got kicked out of our houses, the army even broke my arm. Now I cannot turn my arm anymore like I used to and I cannot use it for everything anymore. I was happy in Pakistan. I worked in the market to move food from one place to another, daily labor jobs. ” (Man, 50 years, Qali Haeri)

2.3. The Jogis- a nomadic community?

In the academic terminology, Jogis are considered to be ‘peripatetic’ people (see chapter 2.1), who use mobility as an economic strategy. However, how actively mobile are the communities today? And how do they perceive their own mobility, as an advantage or plight? And how do they differ from other displaced groups such as IDPs⁴⁹ or returnees⁵⁰?


2.3.1. Jogis and IDPs

A crucial difference in the perception and the living situation of peripatetic groups compared to the 1970s is that they are perceived as a part of the general population on the move. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 75% of all Afghans have experienced displacement at least once in their lifetime, with 400 Afghans on average per day leaving their homes since 2006,⁵¹ and with a current estimate of more than 948 000 IDPs in Afghanistan, out of which more than 103,000 were displaced in the first six month of 2015 alone.⁵² A number of different dynamics are discernable concerning the Jogi communities, their mobility and the mixture with other mobile or displaced communities.

In Kabul, the Jogis are often counted among the IDP/returnee community. According to UNHCR information, Kabul alone has over 50 recognized IDP camps, or “informal settlements”, which are called Kabul Informal Settlements (KIS).⁵³


The KIS houses 9,315 families/ 57,191 individuals on a mixture of privately or governmentally⁵⁴ owned land. The people living in these informal settlements are classified as a mixture of IDPs and returnees. In 12 camps in the Kabul Informal Settlements,⁵⁵ Jogi, Jat or Chori Frosh is registered as either the only ethnicity or as being part of the group that lives in the camp.⁵⁶ However, there are other camps that are marked as a certain ethnicity, for example as a “Pashtun and Tajik” camp, which actually houses a Chori Frosch/peripatetic community⁵⁷. This is closely linked to the fact that “Jogi” or “Chori Frosch” are not exactly ethnic

groups but rather socio-economic categories, which can exist alongside other ethnic identities (see chapter 2.1.).




"40 days ago we came here from Shibergan because of the fighting. I have my cousin here, Haji Rangin. We are renting here now, but we are six families in four rooms. We are tired of moving. We have four children and since we've come here, there is no school here and no material to learn for them. I am not sure when we can go back." (Man, 44 years, Kamarband camp)

In Mazar-e Sharif, the Jogi camps are surrounded by IDP and returnee communities,⁵⁸ but are not counted among the main target groups of INGOs or UN-agency efforts who focus on recently displaced households from Kunduz and other provinces where fighting has taken place. The Jogi communities have generally lived in one place more permanently, with 25% of the Jogi communities having lived in their current place for the past 2-3 years. Having said that, the Jogi communities also house a number of IDP families that have been displaced from recent fighting and have sought refuge with relatives in Mazar-e Sharif.



Both the host community and the displaced households who seek refuge with relatives in the nearby city might consider themselves as Jogi or as peripatetic. However, the reasons for and the attitudes towards their movements vary. When asked about their place of residence, 60% of the respondents stated that they had lived in a place other than Mazar-e Sharif in the past.


The reasons for leaving their past residence ranged from seeking employment (60,9%), conflict/insecurity (30,9%) or ethnic tension (16,8%) to land prices (29,1%). It is likely that the push factor of insecurity might be prevalent especially among recently displaced respondents who are now residing in the Jogi camps. Nevertheless, it might also show how these decisions are intertwined with each other and it might outline an underlying trend of a general move from the countryside into the city. While insecurity in Afghanistan's northern areas has risen in the past years with extended fighting in Kunduz and Shibergan (places from where Jogi households fled), it is not unlikely that heightened tensions also target Jogis specifically. The number of Jogi households naming security/safety concerns as the main pull-factor towards moving to Mazar-e Sharif is signifi-



cantly greater than in the general surrounding population in Mazar (83% among Jogi respondents compared to 32% among non-Jogi respondents⁵⁹). Anecdotal evidence of some individual interviews in the Jogi community supports this line of argument that shows how general insecurity due to fighting is sometimes coincides with rising aggression against the community:

"Once we built houses and a mosque in Shibergan, but then they destroyed our houses. Another time we built houses on governmental land and again the people didn't let us stay there. They destroyed our houses. The fighting started and now we came here, twenty days ago, to our relatives. We don't have a specific piece of land where we would like to stay. We don't care where, if the people let us live here. We cannot live in the desert or in villages because there the war is still going on. It's too insecure and maybe if we moved there, my family would be killed in the fighting." (Man, Zahiruddin Camp)

While employment was a major push factor away from the places that the respondents had lived before, it was only a minor factor (11%) in settling in the Mazar-e Sharif area. Decisive pull factors for settling in the current place are security (83%) and a pre-existing connection to relatives residing there or close by (70%). Other push and pull factors that play a role in the decisions of other urban residents, such as education or access to social services only played a minor role. This might be due to the fact that the Jogi communities have in general a difficult to non-existent access to both.



A point to consider is that even if respondents are IDPs, they can still consider themselves or get categorized as Jogi/Chori Frosch/peripatetic groups. These two categories are not mutually exclusive. Peripatetic groups often have a place that they consider their home base or to which they frequently return. Additionally, a sedentarization process seems to have taken place in which the communities consider one place their permanent home, while only some parts of the family migrate to other places irregularly. In either case, having their homes destroyed



^ Women in Kamarband Camp


or having to move because of insecurity/fighting can leave a peripatetic family with similar struggles like an IDP in addition to the strong social stigma of being judged as a Jogi.

2.3.2. Mobility as a strategy?

While the survey data is generally representative for the Jogi communities, it is skewed with respect to migration patterns. The survey was conducted shortly before and partly during Ramadan in Mazar-e Sharif. During this time, a part of the community decided to move for the time of Ramadan to relatives in Kabul. The reason for this decision, given by the relatives of those who moved, was that Kabul has much more pleasant weather during the summer months, on which Ramadan fell this year. According to their relatives, the families who moved found


it easier to work in Kabul during this time, avoiding the searing temperatures in Mazar-e Sharif. While the move to Kabul gives a general idea of a community that uses migration patterns strategically, it skews the quantitative data, which was only collected from the households that decided to stay in Mazar-e Sharif during this time.

Do you migrate/move for your work outside of the city?



Findings such as the frequency of migration or movement outside of Mazar-e Sharif for work-related reasons therefore have to be seen with a grain of salt, as most people who had just made the decision to move away for several weeks, were not included in the sample. However, even among the respondents who were staying during Ramadan in Mazar-e Sharif, 6,8% stated that they moved sometimes or rarely (18,6%) out of Mazar-e Sharif for work.⁶⁰ Only a few households had moved during the last 12 months (7% in male headed, 11% in female headed households). However, most households have made the experience of moving many times during their stay in Mazar-e Sharif. While 33% of the households stated to have never moved from their current location, 38% had moved twice or three times, 9% had moved 4-5 times or more than 5 times (13%) since settling in Mazar-e Sharif. The relatively high number of families who have not moved in the past 12 months shows the ability of the Jogi communities to develop friendly relations with landlords and to either squat the land for extended periods of times or to broker one-year rental contracts. In either case the living situa-


Since you have been in the Mazar-e Sharif area, how often did you change location of your home?




tion remains precarious as the households can be kicked off the land at the whim of the landowner.

While the households have moved many times within Mazar-e Sharif itself, many residents have lived a long time in the area of the city. 22% have lived in Mazar-e Sharif for 5-7 years, while 35% have lived there longer than 10 years. This points towards the development of either a stable base or general settling down in one place with the self-understanding as a sedentary population. The FGDs and individual interviews showed that the majority, if not all residents in the Jogi camps dreaded moving and did not see it as a positive part of their culture or livelihood. Men and women alike stated that they moved out of necessity because they did not own land and were thrown off the land. Only in one or two instances, interviewees told that they themselves saw better economic opportunities in another place and therefore moved.


Has your family moved on the last 12 months?



Occupancy in camp and area



The relatively high number of respondents who had lived in the Mazar-e Sharif area longer than 10 years correlates with the respondents' birth place: every second respondent of the household survey was born in Balkh. This number furthermore tallies with the number of people stating that they have never lived in an area outside of Mazar-e Sharif and that they have never moved away from Mazar-e Sharif.



Among the respondents, who have lived in an area other than Mazar-e Sharif (60%), almost all have lived in northern Afghanistan. Jawzjan (24%) and Sar-i Pul (22%) were the most common places where families had lived before moving to Mazar, which also correlates with the birthplace of some of the respondents (Jawzjan 12.7%, and Sar-i Pul 18.2%). While only a few (4.1%) were born in Kabul, many respondents stated they had relatives in the capital (75%). This corresponds with the fact that Kabul is the only other place, apart from Afghanistan's north, where respondents have spent time before settling in Mazar-e Sharif.



^ House in a Jogi camp in front of housing of urban non-Jogi Mazaris

⁹ Rao, 1987, p.1.

¹⁰ Both: Rao, 1987, p.3.

¹¹ See: Rao, 2004, p.270.

¹² Rao, 1987, p.4.

¹³ Gypsy has various similar terms in other European languages such as: Calé (Spanish), Manouches (French), Kalderatsch (Russian), Zigeuner (German). These are societal constructs that have grown and were developed from late Middle Ages until contemporary times, see: Bogdal, 2011, p.15.

¹⁴ Encyclopedia Iranica, Jean-Pierre Digard, “Gypsies i. Gypsies of Persia”, available in print. Vol. XI, Fasc. 4, pp. 412-415, online originally published: December 15, 2002 <http://iranicaonline.org/articles/gypsy>.

¹⁵ Rao, 2004, p.272.

¹⁶ Rao, 1986(a), p.280, further reading into the history of Rom-communities in Europe: Bogdal, 2011.

¹⁷ Rao/Berland/Salo, 2004, p.14.

¹⁸ Bazmee Ansari, A.S.. “Djāt.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E.Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. Universiteit Leiden. 07 May 2014 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/djat-SIM_2021>: “The name is of post-Sanskritic Indian origin (Middle Indo-Aryan * djatta), and the form with short vowel is employed by the Persian translator of the Čač-nāma (compiled 613/1216), the author of the Ta’rīkh-i Sind (Ta’rīkh-i Ma’sūmī) and Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī [q.v.] in his Persian letters”.

¹⁹ Rao, 2004, p.274.

²⁰ Indeed, when Rao conducted her research on peripatetic groups in Afghanistan in the 1970s, she did not find anyone who labelled themselves as ‘Jat’, see: Rao, 2004, 274. None of the respondents in the current study self-identified as Jat either.

²¹ Rao, 2004, p.274, p.276, p.282.

²² Rao, 2004, p.274.

²³ Rao observed in the 1970s that “Jat” was a frequently used swearword: “In the Persian (Dari) commonly spoken in Kabul, shrewdish women were admonished not to be quarrelsome like the Jat (“Jat na sho!”, lit. “don’t be like a Jat!”), children playing about in dirt heaps were mocked at with ‘you’re like a Jat’ (“misl-e Jat asti!”) and in orthodox, semi-urban contexts girls who tended to be careless and carefree in speech and dress were also described by disapproving elders as behaving like Jat women” (Rao, 2004, p.275) This observation was confirmed by non-Jogi interviewees.

²⁴ Informal interviews: January 2014 in Kabul, May and June 2015 in Mazar-e Sharif and June 2015 in Kabul.

²⁵ Rao, 1988, p.115.

²⁶ Rao, 2004, p.275.

²⁷ Olesen,1987, p.35

²⁸ Olesen, 1994, p.132.

²⁹ Rao, 2004, p.280.

³⁰ See: Rao, 1986(a), p.265f., Olesen, 1994, p.206., Rao, 1986(b), p.164, p.155 and p.157..

³¹ See also: Rao, 1986(a), p.268; Rao, 1986(b), p.155, p.157.

³² Rao, 1986(a), p.267.

³³ Sufis who renounce worldly possessions and mainly live off alms.

³⁴ Rao, 1986(b), p.155; Rao, 1986(a), p.267.

³⁵ Rao, 1986(a), p.269.

³⁶ For example: The Shāh Nāma narrates that the Sassanian king Bahrām-i Gur (AD 421-39) imported nomadic musicians from India to Iran, both of which included vast areas of present-day Afghanistan at that time. Hennion/ Nicolle call this “the first mention of the ancestors of Jogi and Chori Frosh in Central Asia...in literary sources of that time under the name of Luli or Luri”. Olesen, however, cautions against using this source as evidence for the general Indian origin of all peripatetic groups in Iran and Afghanistan as not all peripatetic groups can be categorized as gypsies and their origins are diverse. See: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/gypsy-i>, Hennion/Nicolle, p.16, Olesen, 1994, p.216.

³⁷ For different theories on mythical origins and ethnographic speculations, see: Olesen, 1994, p.68.

³⁸ Hennion/Nicolle, p.17; Rao, 1986(a), p.266.

³⁹ Rao, 1986(a), p.266; p.273.

⁴⁰ Barfield, 2010, p.69; also: Marsden/Hopkins, 2013, p.27.

⁴¹ Barfield, 2010, p.46.

⁴² Barfield, 2010, p.139.

⁴³ (Rao, 1986(a), p.273)

⁴⁴ Olesen, 1994, p.17.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Olesen, 1994, p.28.

⁴⁷ Informal Interviews during participant observation in Kabul Informal Settlements (KIS), November 2013-February 2014.

⁴⁸ Interview with UNHCR official in Kabul, 26.01.2014. While these ID cards were referenced in an interview in 2014, none of these ID cards could be verified during the survey.

⁴⁹ Definition of IDPs: “Persons or groups of persons, who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human

rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.” In: UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (as cited in “Challenges of IDP Protection”)

⁵⁰ Returnees are considered here as former refugees who have returned to Afghanistan.

⁵¹ See: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 16.04.2012: “Afghanistan/ Durable solutions far from reach amid escalating conflict”.

⁵² Both numbers as of July 2015: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, “Afghanistan IDP Figures Analysis” <http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/afghanistan/figures-analysis>

⁵³ These numbers, if not otherwise stated, come from the UNHCR Sub-Office Kabul, reference list August 2015.

⁵⁴ Governmental includes hereby municipally and ministerially owned land.

⁵⁵ These settlements are located in Shahrake Police (Chamani Babrak) PD4; Qalai Wazir PD5; Charahi Qamber 1 and 2 in PD5; Dewan Begi PD5; Hewadwall Blocks PD 8; Puli Safeed /Bene Hesar PD8; Shahrak-Aria (Qalai Chaman) PD10; Proje Hussain Khil /Bagrami PD12; Puli Shina /Bagrami PD12; Ada Mazar PD 17; Near Kotal Check Point PD 17.

⁵⁶ The total number of population of these 12 camps is listed as 2,738 families/14,179 individuals, see: UNHCR Sub- Office Kabul list, August 2015.

⁵⁷ Participany Observation 2013 in Qala’e Balkhi camp.

⁵⁸ Observations during field research supported findings of Hennion/ Nicolle, p.34.

⁵⁹ However, it needs to be noted that the PIN Urban Poverty Study was conducted in 2014 before much of the recent fighting intensified in Afghanistan’s northern provinces.

⁶⁰ The 2011 Samuel Hall report found that none of the respondents considered themselves ‘nomadic’. However, the very term for ‘nomad’ in Persian (kuchi/kuchian) has been claimed over the past decade by pastoral nomads who have gained political leverage with 10 seats in parliament and rights inscribed in the Afghan constitution. Depending on how the question of migration is posed, the answer might echo the prevalent cultural definition of ‘nomad’ as the (former) pastoral nomads and not the peripatetic nomads.



3. The Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif


3.1. Community Profile

The following section provides an overview of the demographic profile of the current Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif, based on the findings of the fieldwork conducted in five Jogi communities, in Kamarband, Zehraddin (three camps) and Qali Haeri respectively.

Ethnic and Group Affiliation

Ethnicity and group affiliation are important traits of social organization, which are produced through ascription and self-ascription, “in so far as individuals embrace it, are constrained by it, act on it, and experience it”⁶¹. When asked about their ethnic or group identity, the majority of camp-residents saw themselves as either Tajik (39%), Jogi (36%) or Tajik-Jogi (16%). As described earlier, the term Jogi is rather a socio-economic category that is not exclusive of other affiliations, which might explain why people found it unproblematic to combine it with being Tajik⁶². Compared to earlier reports, the Tajik-identity seemed weaker (55% compared to 76%) and the self-assertion as Jogis stronger (52% compared to 23%⁶³) compared to a report of Jogi communities in 2011. However, these definitions should be viewed with caution as these group and ethnic affiliations are “highly situational, not primordial”⁶⁴: the presence of researchers connected to an aid agency which is perceived as looking to help Jogi communities might give rise to the Jogi identity as a currency, whereas in other situations community members might identify more strongly with being Tajik. Nearly all respondents stated that they spoke Dari in their households with each other. Only some claimed to speak Arabic (8 respondents), Pashto (2), Uzbeki (1), Turkman (1) or Pamiri (1) languages. None of the respondents indicated community specific dialects or “secret languages”⁶⁵. However, the enumerators reported that community members were sometimes difficult to understand because they would use non-standard idioms.

Ethnicity & Group Affiliation



Language

Dari	94,35%
Arabic	3,48%
Pashto	0,87%
Uzbeki	0,43%
Turkman	0,43%
Pamiri	0,43%


Place of Birth

Balkh	50,9%
Sar-i-Pul	18,2%
Jawzjan	12,7%
Faryab	5,0%
Kabul	4,1%
Kunduz	4,1%
Baghlan	0,9%
Khost	0,9%
Bamyan	0,5%
Helmand	0,5%
Kandahar	0,5%
Laghman	0,5%
Nimroz	0,5%
Parwan	0,5%
Samangan	0,5%

Birthplace and relatives in other parts of the country

Every second respondent of the household survey was born in Balkh and the majority of respondents (92,3%) were born in northern Afghanistan (Balkh, Sar-i Pul, Jawzjan, Faryab, Kunduz, Baghlan, Samangan). No respondent had been born in Central Asia, which is a significant absence as the community is often linked to originating from Central Asia (Tajikistan or Kholab) and to still have links there.


Relatives outside of Mazar-e Sharif



Of the 220 interviewees of the household survey, 83% stated that they had relatives within Afghanistan who were not living in Mazar-e Sharif with them. However, only 28% indicated that they had relatives living outside of Afghanistan. Of the 183 respondents, who stated that they had relatives living in other parts of Afghanistan, 75% stated to have relatives living in Kabul, 43% in Kunduz, 23% in Sar-i Pul, 15% in Faryab and Baghlan respectively. The high number of relatives in Kabul can be explained through the general pull that Afghanistan’s capital has exerted on displaced Afghans, other nomads and economic

migrants: the number of inhabitants has multiplied in the past decade⁶⁶ and people move to Kabul in search of better security prospects and economic prosperity. Generally, a strong connection seems to exist to Afghanistan’s northern provinces, especially to Kunduz, where over a third (43%) of respondents with relatives outside of Mazar had family connections.

Relatives outside of Afghanistan



The few respondents, who have relatives living abroad, stated that they were living in Iran (54%), Pakistan (33%) or Tajikistan (13%). While none of the respondents were born in Central Asia, they nevertheless still had relatives there:

"About 600 families are still there [in Tajikistan]. We don't get to see them, because the Afghan government does not give us the tazkera [ID card] to visit them. They are not our direct family, but we know them" (Man, 56 years, Qali Haeri Camp)

"When our relatives from Tajikistan came they told us that here we are living very poor, without houses, without land. They told us that life is better in Tajikistan. I've never been to Tajikistan, but they said that they would support us but right now they would not be able to do so. I don't know the area where they live

and we are not in regular contact. I have never tried or planned to go to Tajikistan." (Man, 75 years, Zahiruddin III)

Household Composition

The average household size in the Jogi communities is surprisingly small with an average of 4.9 persons per household, compared to an average household size of 7.4 in the rest of Afghan society.⁶⁷ This trend is combined with a very young marriage age and a generally young population. While the CSO points out that "the most striking feature of the Afghan population is its very young age structure,"⁶⁸ the Jogi population shows an even stronger base of under-18 year olds: according to CSO data, 56,8% of the Afghan population is under 18; among the Jogi communities 74.9% is under 18. This means that three quarters of the community would legally count as under-age.

	Jogi	CSO/urban settled ⁶⁹	difference
0–5 years			
male	14,10%	9,36%	4,74%
female	12,00%	9,46%	2,54%
5–10 years			
male	12,30%	7,79%	4,51%
female	10,90%	7,50%	3,40%
10–18 years			
male	14,40%	11,66%	2,74%
female	11,20%	11,00%	0,20%
older than 18			
male	12,70%	22,68%	9,98%
female	12,40%	20,55%	8,15%
Total			
male	53,50%	51%	2,50%
female	46,50%	49%	2,50%

The fieldwork showed however a different understanding of adulthood among the Jogi community with several cases of youth as young as 12 to 14 years already married with one or two children. The new household formed through marriage un-




▲ Jogi family

ions still lives in the vicinity of other relatives and of the parental household, however it is seen as a self-sufficient unit. If one takes into account this local understanding of early adulthood, it can be shown that the ratio of children versus young adults in the work-force and in locally understood marriage-age is more balanced. This anecdotal evidence suggests that Jogi children leave their parents’ household earlier than the average Afghan and therefore also become self-contained nuclear family units earlier, connected to the family through proximity but counted as unique economic units.




Age ratio in Jogi communities



Head of Household

Contrary to the general perception in Afghan society of Jogi households as economically and socially controlled by women, the response of the household survey shows that women head only 12% of the surveyed households. In the cases in which the household was said to be headed by a woman and in which the female household head was interviewed herself, 67% were widowed, 5% divorced and 28% were married and living with their spouses. This stands in stark contrast to the male-headed households, in which nearly all⁷⁰ interviewed household heads were married and living with their spouses. While the respondents stated that the households were mainly formally headed by men, women participate equally in some generating activities in the households and often take on the responsibility of handling the finances for the households.

Gender of head of household



3.2. Living Situation

3.2.1. No Land Ownership – “No Home, no nothing”

Land ownership has been voiced by the inhabitants of the Jogi camps as a major concern which underlies most other problems. None of the families in the Jogi communities in Kamarband Balkhi, Zehrudin (three camps) and Qali Haeri owned land or had land deeds for the plots they were occupying.

“For us mainly the land is a serious problem. Moving from one place to another is not safe. It’s also not true that people say we like to move. We don’t like it, but sometimes we have to.” (Man, 45 years, Zahiruddin camp)

“I sent my son to Quranic classes, but then we had to move to a different place. By now he has forgotten most of what he had learnt. We are not interested to be displaced, to move from one place to another. We would be so happy if we could get or buy land.” (Woman, 31 years, Kamarband Camp)


“The biggest difficulty is that we don’t have money to buy the land here. If the landlord wants to, he can throw us out any time. It happened several times that we stayed on the street without anything. No home, no nothing. The men found this place where we are now.” (Man, 52 years, Zahiruddin camp)

The absence of property is linked to both the poverty of the community and the absence of ID cards/tazkira ownership. The nearly complete absence of tazkira ownership makes it impossible for Jogi households to buy or own property.

The Focus Group Discussions and individual interviews explicitly challenged frequent stereotypes about their community as being nomadic and as enjoying migration without a stable home base. Moving from one place to another with the ever-pending threat of expulsion was voiced as a general insecurity in every step of the households’ planning, especially in access to education.⁷¹

While none of the households owned land, more than half (62%) were able to arrange rent-arrangements with the land-owner and secure their position on the land they stayed on at least for a certain time. Slightly more male-headed households (63%) were able to do so in comparison to female-headed ones (52%). The rest squatted the land without paying any rent.

Housing situation



“We built the room by ourselves, we pay 4000AFA for rent. I don’t eat anything until I can afford the rent” (Woman, 29 years, Kamarband)

“It is based on the room how much you pay. If you have two wives and an older married son, then you need 3 rooms. But then you also need to pay land for three rooms.” (Man, 42 years, Zahiruddin)


“When we moved we built our houses ourselves. The men build the houses. We take the poles, destroy the houses and build new ones in the next place. It takes 20 days or up to a month to build such a house.” (Man, 47 years, Zahiruddin I)

The houses that the Jogi communities occupy are constructed out of pressed mud (pakhsa) walls. All the houses are built by the men in the community themselves. Rent payments are measured per room that is built on the land. While the respondents were glad about the opportunity to have a semi-stable place to stay, they complained in many informal conversations

about the general environment and found it filthy, which they expressed in conversations like this: *"But look around here. People put trash and garbage here. We don't like to live in a place with all that. We cleaned out the area where we built our houses, but we don't like to live in an unclean area like this."* (Man, 70 years, Zahiruddin III)


3.2.2. Access to Electricity

Only 39% of the Jogi households have access to electricity, compared to 91,4% of urban non-Jogi households in Mazar-e Sharif.⁷²



While non-Jogi households in Mazar mainly use electricity from the grid (88,9%), only 26% of the few Jogi households who have access to electricity in general, use the local electricity network directly. Many more get access to the grid through power lines spun from their neighbors (53%), which points to the fact that the Jogi households are often occupying the land they live on without any legal certificates or contracts or are not recognized as full tenants due to not holding an ID card (taz-kira). Another noteworthy difference is the existence of some solar panels in the Jogi community that are used for generating


electricity. 18% of the surveyed households, who had access to electricity, generated it through their own solar panels. When asked, the households said that they had bought the panels themselves and it could not be ascertained whether the households had paid for them on their own or obtained them through contacts with NGOs.



3.2.3. Water and Sanitation

In comparison with non-Jogi households in Mazar, the Jogi households were on par when it comes to non-treatment of water (the water is generally seen by the community as clean and of good quality). 69% stated that they did not see a problem obtaining good quality drinking water. Only 29% said that the household faced difficulties in obtaining drinking water in the quality and quantity needed in the household. For 90% of the households, the drinking water is the same as the water they use for other chores such as washing clothes. It is there-


fore not surprising that the levels of satisfaction concerning access and quality of water used for other chores were almost identical with the satisfaction level on drinking water access (18% strongly agreed, 52% somewhat agreed, 28% somewhat disagreed and only 1% strongly disagreed with the statement that the household does not have any problems to obtain water needed for other kinds of use).



However, the time for fetching water is much longer for the Jogi households than for the non-Jogi households in Mazar. 80% of the non-Jogi households fetch their water in less than 15 minutes as compared to 15% of the Jogi households who do so. Most Jogi households take 15-30 minutes to fetch their water (51%) or even longer than half an hour (34%), which is rather the exception for non-Jogi households (6%).

This is linked to ownership of water and the water source that is used to obtain water. Only 4% of the surveyed Jogi households had water in the compound itself, and only 2% said that they owned the water source which they were using.



Most Jogi households obtain water through public pumps (53%) or public wells (33%), whereas non-Jogi households mainly use water piped into their house (41,4%).




The problem does not seem to lie with the quality of the water once the community accesses it, but with the aspect of access- ing it in the first place: household members need to set aside the time to fetch the water for all needs (drinking, washing, cleaning, watering plants or feeding animals). Furthermore, they do not own access to the water and therefore depend on rela- tions to the wider community to be accepted as a user.

More non-Jogi households use open defecation or have no toilet whatsoever (14,7%) compared to the surveyed Jogi households (2%). Jogi households generally use traditional latrines (92%) and only a select few have access to improved latrines (5%), which are in comparison more frequently available to non-Jogi households (31,9%).

The ratio of households sharing toilets with others to house- holds who use their latrines only themselves is similar in Jogi to non-Jogi households. However, more Jogi households are sharing latrines (39%) compared to non-Jogi households (26%). Only 25% of the Jogi households stated that their household is connected to a sewage network.




^ Water cannisters and solar panel, Kamarband Camp




3.4. Legal Situation and Social marginalization

The aspect that sets the peripatetic communities apart from other populations both in the informal settlements/IDP camps as well as from other settled and nomadic people, is that they generally do not have access to the acknowledgement as an Afghan citizen through the Afghan ID card⁷³ (tazkera/tazkira). However, there has been some progress in this issue in the past years which implies that improvement of the situation is possible and has already been selectively available to some individuals in the Jogi communities. Lack of knowledge about the legal situation of Jogi communities or a mixture of indifference and prejudices among the various decision makers hinders the advancement of the basic rights situation of the Jogi community.



In theory, every Afghan citizen, regardless of their age and sex can obtain a tazkera; for men it is mandatory.⁷⁴ Many Afghans, however, “do not have [a] tazkira because they have not gone through the labyrinth of administrative procedures necessary to obtain one”⁷⁵. Generally speaking, the procedure seems simple at first: an application letter with two recent photographs and “the tazkera of one close relative of the father’s side of the

family (father, grandfather, brother, uncle, cousin), or for married females with the husband’s Tazkera or that of one of his male relatives”⁷⁶ must be submitted. The problem already starts, however, when none of the relatives of the person who wants to apply for a tazkera owns an ID card yet, as most peripatetics have “never been registered in the national archives and thus have left no bureaucratic trace, which makes it more difficult for their successors to register.”⁷⁷



This leads to a situation in which the ownership of officially registered ID cards is rare or nonexistent. Respondents in this current study stated that only 9% of the household heads in male-headed households and 7% of the household heads in female headed households own an Afghan ID card (tazkera). These findings are congruent with other reports in which overall 80% of Jogi/Chori Frosh interviewees did not have a tazkera⁷⁸ or even none owned a tazkera.⁷⁹

However, when asked not after the head of household but after their own status as ID card holders, the respondents⁸⁰ in the Jogi communities showed a surprisingly high amount of tazkera-ownership among Jogi men (42%) and women (27%).

These differing outcomes in combination with information from the FGDs point to the rather confused bureaucratic situation overall in terms of the issuance of tazkeras, particularly the prevalence of fake ID cards.

PROCESS OF OBTAINING AN AFGHAN TAZKERA

Obtaining an Afghan ID card (tazkera) consists of three steps: submitting personal details, verification of identity, and if successful, document issuance (TLO, p. 2). Personal details are submitted as an application letter with two recent photographs and “the tazkera of one close relative of the father’s side of the family (father, grandfather, brother, uncle, cousin), or for married females with the husband’s Tazkera or that of one of his male relatives” (UNHCR). Reportedly, however, tazkeras of relatives are not always required if witnesses can be produced. (TLO, p. 17) Verification is the most complex part because birth certificates are uncommon and the tazkera is required to obtain most other identity documents. Identity of the applicant is usually validated through government officials, neighborhood representatives (wakil-e guzars) or village representatives (maliks). Additionally, the applicant needs to be situated in an existing family tree, which is recorded in the central, provincial or district PRDs (TLO, p.16). Kuchis (pastoral nomads) complete the tazkera process at the Independent Directorate of Kuchi Affairs (IDKA) and verify their identity with a Kuchi malik. They may obtain their tazkera at their winter or summer location and their tazkera details both places.

Forged Documents?

Forged tazkeras are quite common due to a lack of security features in the current tazkera documents.⁸¹ What supports this line of argumentation is the high number of Jogis who stated that the tazkera they own is a Kuchi/nomadic tazkera, which was the case in 83% of all respondents owning a tazkera. This number is suspiciously high, especially when viewed in light of the procedure of obtaining tazkeras for Kuchis, which goes through the Independent Department of Kuchi Affairs (IDKA).

Kuchi leaders have to register regionally with IDKA and officials of the Independent Department of Kuchi Affairs are aware and sometimes even hostile towards Jogi communities, attempting to distance the image of Kuchis and Jogis from each other.⁸² Jogi elders cannot register with IDKA, but might attempt to pass as Kuchis in claiming (fake) Kuchi ID cards. The outcome of owning a forged ID is ambivalent:

"Most of the time you cannot say whether a tazkera is fake or not. The only place to verify, whether an ID card is real, is the archives, because everything is paper-based -so far. This could of course change with the electronic tazkera that they are currently trying to implement." (Kueppers, Interview)⁸³

"These tazkeras that they show don't have records. It's just a paper. And some of the Jats, they managed to bribe the local authorities and managed to get tazkeras as Kuchis." (Interview with UN official, 2013)

These illegal ID cards are as researchers or authorities describe them "just a paper" in the sense that they might help the person who carries this ID card in street controls. They are, however, for any other purpose useless and don't offer any rights or protection to the holders of these cards.

Change of policy and attitudes?

While it might well be that many of the tazkeras owned by the Jogi respondents are forged, there were also signs of a change in the policy and policy implementation concerning peripatetic groups such as the Jogi and Chori Frosh. This change is detectable in the recent IDP policy and has been voiced in discussions and in-depth interviews with Jogi interviewees as well as AIHRC and NGO officials.

The two laws regulating the decision on citizenship in Afghanistan are the constitution of 2004 and the citizenship law. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan states that

"any kind of discrimination and distinction between citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden"⁸⁴. Acknowledged as Afghans are people who are "Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwi and other tribes"⁸⁵ with the recognized Afghan languages of "Pashto, Dari, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pachaie, Nuristani, Pamiri and other current languages in the country"⁸⁶. The constitution states furthermore in chapter 1, article 4 that "no individual of the nation of Afghanistan shall be deprived of citizenship"⁸⁷. Both phrases of "other tribes" and "other current languages" seem to suggest that other groups such as the Jogi/Jat could be recognized as Afghans. And indeed:

"The citizenship law issued in 2000 rules that a person who has been living in the country for more than five years, has not committed any crimes and is aged over 18 can apply for citizenship; furthermore, it explicitly states that children born inside Afghanistan to parents with unclear citizenship status have the right to apply for citizenship." (Kueppers, 2014, p. 9)⁸⁸

This look at both the constitution and the citizenship law reveals a discrepancy of legal frameworks and on-the-ground realities, of which the peripatetic groups are victims. These laws could have been the basis in the past decade to lobby for equal citizenship status for Jogi communities. However, the Samuel Hall report of 2011 and the TLO Tazkera report of 2013 both attest the virtual non-existence of ID cards in Jogi communities and considerable resistance among Afghan central authorities to issue them. The 2011 Samuel Hall report specifically cites the fruitless attempts made by the AIHRC to push for a recognition of the Jogi as Afghan citizens, with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) blocking the initiative.

This situation, however, seems to have changed. An AIHRC official in Kabul stated that the letter issued by the AIHRC to then president Hamid Karzai has been answered favorably before Karzai resigned:



▲ Man with tazkera, Kamarband Camp

"Karzai wrote back a letter to the commission stating that the Jogi deserve tazkeras and they were given tazkera/national ID. This was in 1383." (AIHRC Kabul official)

However, even if such a statement by Karzai has been issued, Jogis are still experiencing difficulties especially in provinces other than Kabul to obtain ID cards:

“When Karzai issued a letter to the department of national ID, they [Jogis] were given the ID here in Kabul...[however,] the governments in the provinces are not interested in what Karzai has issued. So they [the Jogi] face a legal problem. When they go to court they are not helped, because they are not seen as Afghan citizens.” (AIHRC Kabul official)

In practical terms, the slow pace at which information is dispersed in Afghanistan has also caused some confusion. Far from the administrative center, officials are often unaware of changes that have taken place and the bureaucratic procedures needed to accommodate the changes. Among Jogis, while some were of the opinion that they were not allowed to own tazkeras, others reported that it was possible to obtain them in Kabul and Kunduz.⁸⁹ The latter information that was referenced by several FGD participants implicitly points towards the difficulty of obtaining an ID in other provinces. These problems that peripatetics face are also referenced by the 2014 IDP policy⁹⁰ that urges the Ministry of Interior to take the lead in a concerted effort to ensure that ID cards are issued to all citizens equally:


“6.3.2 Regarding the Tazkera (f) Mol will cooperate with MOWA, MoLSAMD and MoBTA to see that assistance is given to separated, unaccompanied or orphaned IDP children to obtain tazkeras, and to members of certain groups, notably the Kuchi, Jogi and Chori Frosh, who generally do not have tazkeras and who face special difficulties in acquiring them.” (p. 37)

The director of the Department of Population Registration (PRD) in Kabul stated that peripatetic groups such as Jogis are allowed to obtain tazkeras.⁹¹ This knowledge, however, is very unevenly distributed among Jogi households, officials of the regional tazkera departments and responsible decision makers for the new electronic tazkera.⁹² The e-tazkera, as the electronic tazkera initiative is called, is not only an attempt to transform the existing technology for ID cards in Afghanistan, but it specifically targets the IDP population in Kabul in the very first roll-out phases.⁹³ The

knowledge whether the peripatetic population among the IDPs in the KIS is legally allowed to obtain ID cards, was not available. The distribution of e-tazkeras to Jogis, however, could lift them out of their socio-political invisibility and give them rights for the first time that have been denied to them structurally before.


3.5. Economic Situation

The following section analyses the economic profile of the Jogi communities that were surveyed in Mazar-e Sharif. The data shows interesting dynamics pertaining both to a comparison with non-Jogi households and a comparison of gendered practices within the households that confirm some stereotypes and contradict others.



In nearly all households it is the household head him- or herself who handles the finances for the rest of the family. Only in exceptional cases it is the wife, mother or the father of the household head who takes over this task. While only 12% of the respondents stated, that their households were formally headed by a woman, 28,6% stated that their finances were run by a

Average of male/female workers per family




female household head. While this might sound at first contradictory, it is straightforward in light of the common stereotypes of the Jogi communities – particularly the stereotype of (considered) un-Afghan characteristic of women as the sole breadwinners – and the Jogi reaction to them. Tellingly, if asked directly who the head of their household is, they might formally state that it is the man, in line with Afghan social norms. However, the reality may be somewhat different with more women handling the finances and being involved in the work force, which in turn gives them more leverage in household decisions.

On average there are slightly more men than women said to be working per family, which supports earlier findings of the UNICEF report, which stated that the men in Jogi families actually contribute equally or more to the income of the family.⁹⁴ This contradicts a commonly held stereotype of Jogi men as inactive and Jogi women as the main breadwinner. Contrary to

many non-Jogi households, Jogi men and women contribute equally to the household income. While it is important to note that Afghanistan’s economy offers jobs for women and many women are engaged in the workforce with women as pilots,⁹⁵ police officers,⁹⁶ taxi drivers⁹⁷ and office workers in urban areas, the markets (bazaars) where the Jogi women go to beg or Chori Frosch women sell their bangles, are still male-dominated with men as sellers. Peripatetic women were considered ‘anomalies’ in the 1970s⁹⁸ and still today function as boundary and status makers of these groups, as the author’s interviews unambiguously showed. Letting women work in the public sphere of the markets, especially through begging, which is an occupation that is generally held in low regard, is interpreted as a mark of “un-Afghanness.”

Daily labor, transport and construction work are the main occupations of the men in the communities. Several families own

Income sources depending on gender and household lead



^ Girls with a boy, Kamarband Camp

three-wheeled transport-motorbikes (zeranj), which they use to offer services to non-Jogi clients to transport goods. At least 4-5 zerañjes were counted in camp Kamarband and one zerañj in Zahiruddin camp. Most labor is unskilled, but some men have acquired skills in construction and building. All of the houses that the communities live in were built by the men of the community themselves. These occupations, however, provide only low and fluctuating incomes.

Women mainly beg or work as maids in someone else’s family. The widowed and divorced female-headed households rely much more on begging, but nearly all women are engaging in this activity. Children accompany women often during begging,

or work on the streets as an ‘espandi’, a person who wards away misfortune from the ‘evil eye’ by performing rituals with cans filled with incense to passerby in exchange for money.⁹⁹

“Usually I go for begging. Sometimes I work in the neighboring houses, washing clothes, cleaning to get some income. But most of the time I go to beg.” (Woman, 45 years, Zahiruddin)
“Normally, I go out to beg. My husband is a daily laborer and certain times our son does esfandi/espandi. We have to go all the time for begging otherwise we would not have any money. My child is a heart patient, but I don’t have any money to take it to the doctor.” (Woman, 23 years, Kamarband)

3.5.1. Attitudes Towards Begging

A common stereotype about Jogis is that they are begging and that they are enjoying this occupation as a “lifestyle”. Both the FGDs and the individual interviews however found a unanimous disdain among the Jogi community for begging and a wish to change their primary occupation.

“I don’t like that my grandchildren are begging. Whenever my grandchildren go, people might give them money, but then ask: ‘why are you coming to beg all the time?’ That’s why we don’t like to send our children.” (Woman, 77 years, Kamarband Camp)

“I go begging at the market, but I don’t like it, because I cannot find time to take proper care of my children, to wash them and tend to them. Meanwhile, the weather is hot and we are in the bazaar. And I cannot even provide them enough to eat. Whenever we go to beg, other people are bothering us, asking me why my husband doesn’t work, why we are begging.” (Woman, 22 years, Zahiruddin Camp)

“I don’t like to go begging with friends. I would rather like to play with my friends.” (Boy, 13 years, Kamarband Camp)


Some of the impediments to change are the lack of education and the lack of skills in other trades. Some NGO workers have lamented the Jogi communities’ resistance to take part in vocational trainings or to send their children to school. The FGDs in this survey found that both men and women in the Jogi communities were interested in vocational training and especially in the education of their children, if the timings of both are compatible with the work that sustains the communities’ existence. Respondents criticized that offers to learn new skills or to send children to school would not take into account that the hours spent in such trainings or school take away from the work hours that bring the crucial income for the families to survive.

“On a normal day, I go begging. I go to Langar Khana for that. I get bread, rice, and cash. I go together with my mother and sister. I would like to start to go to school. For the moment, I am not going to the mosque, but I would like to go there as well.” (Boy, 11 years, Kamarband Camp)

“Normally, because we are jobless and our husbands are jobless as well, we have to go for begging. I would like to have a peaceful life for me and my children. I am worried about the future of my children, I hope for a better life for them. I’d like to put them into school. I hate begging, but I have to. Certain times, we take our children to the bazaar for begging, most people are saying: why do you bring your children for begging? But we have to do it, because if we cannot find money we have to suffer and stay hungry. Therefore we have to bring our children while we are begging to help us, but that is also a reason why people hate us, because we carry our children while we are begging.” (Woman, 24 years, Kamarband Camp)

While begging is the most visible occupation of the Jogi community and is often associated with the communities’ women begging in the cities’ bazaars, they are also engaging in other occupations. The women have built up lasting connections with non-Jogi households, which they visit to clean, wash dishes or clothing. This aspect of the Jogi economy is underdeveloped and only to be found among 23% of the households. It nevertheless shows the contact between Jogi and non-Jogi households and the existing economic ties between these different groups.

Compared to other urban residents, non-Jogi households in Mazar have a broader spectrum of occupations in which they engage than Jogi households. They also appear to have access to more secure jobs in the public administration, police force, the army or in skilled vocations such as mechanics, miners, teachers. Access to capital also offers the opportunity to engage in business activities such as retail sales and trade.





^ Man with bird cages, Zahiruddin Camp

3.5.2. Unexplored economic and socio-cultural resources/ opportunities

Several economic and socio-cultural activities of Jogi communities are unknown to most development workers and outsiders who are not directly in touch with either these activities or the community as such. Knowledge of these activities, however, can offer developmental opportunities. There are several other activities pursued by the Jogi communities in Mazar that bring on the one hand an often irregular income, and on the other hand a socio-cultural resource that connects Jogi individuals with non-Jogi communities. While the Jogi communities are characterized by their low social status, they are simultaneously connected to the broader Afghan society through economic ties such as taking care of animals from neighbors and several shared pastimes, primarily bird breeding for quail fights and participation in the most Afghan of all sports, namely buzkashi. Other individual ties can be found through music such as in the well-known Jogi musician Haji Rangin, who collaborates with other non-Jogi musicians and plays at many non-Jogi wedding receptions. These individual connections between the Jogi community and other Afghans shows that the isolation and stigmatization of the community can be broken and is not all encompassing.

3.3.1. Bodana jangi (quail fighting)

Raising birds for singing and fighting is an old tradition in Afghanistan. Cocks, quails, canaries, or partridges are raised and pitted against each other in physical fights or singing competitions.¹⁰⁰ While a 2013 AAN piece by Obaid Ali¹⁰¹ considers quail fighting (bodana jangi) as a traditionally Pashtun pastime (called Karak bazi in Kandahar), photographic material¹⁰² and the findings of this survey found strong connections of the competition to Northern Afghanistan and other social groups such as the Jogis.

The men of the Jogi communities catch the quails (bodana) and other birds such as nightingales in the surrounding areas of Mazar-e Sharif, as well as in the Shahdian mountains, in Dasht-e



^ Man showing pipes used to attract birds, Kamarband Camp

Leili, and in the Shibergan area.¹⁰³ The men are responsible for keeping, raising and training the birds. Some birds are raised for singing, in which case the men play songs on their mobile phones for the birds to get them to imitate the songs. Other birds, however, are trained to fight against each other.

Quail fighting was banned under the Taliban, but has experienced a revival since 2001.¹⁰⁴ The ban is associated with the betting that often accompanies the fight itself:

"Quails most frequently fight for two or three minutes. Very rarely a fight lasts as long as 10 to 15 minutes. The enthusiasts challenge each other, betting their money in advance on the quail they think will win. Both sides have their supporters, who also lay down their bets ahead of time. Once the day of the battle comes, more money is bet, depending on which bird is performing better during the fight on that Thursday morning. Bets start from 1,000 Afghanis and can reach up to 100,000 Afghanis (\$20USD up to \$2,000USD)." [Obaid, 2013]

The bird, which is driven from the delineated fighting area, is considered the loser of the contest. Contrary to other animal fights, the quails usually don't sustain any serious injuries.¹⁰⁵ While a good fighting or singing bird can be sold for a high price, birds of such quality are rare: "We keep the singing birds and raise them for 3-4 months and then find different customers to sell them. Once they start singing, the customer knows which ones are the good ones. The price starts with 100 AFA up to 10.000AFA¹⁰⁶. But typically with this latter quality, you only have one or two." (Male interviewee, 25 years, Kamarband) Bird raising can bring money into the household economy, however, it is so irregular and seasonal that the household cannot build a stable economy connected to the skills of raising and training the birds.

One reason why the connection between Jogi men and bird raising has not been recorded before might be their own categorization of bird raising as "shauq", literally 'fun'.¹⁰⁷ It is seen as a pastime that does not bring serious economic gains and is associated by outsiders sometimes as a hobby that takes Jogi men away from paid labour.¹⁰⁸ However, participation in competitions and seller-customer relations point towards an interesting dynamic in which the Jogi community is not cut off from Afghan society, but maintains multiple connections and relations with other individuals and groups in the broader society.



^ Quail, Zahiruddin Camp

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"The men own the birds. They catch them in the Shahdian mountains and in the desert. In March they can find the homes



^ Boy showing net used to catch birds, Kamarband Camp

of the birds when they are nesting and take the young birds out of the nest. We train the birds not to fly away and then the men make competitions and let the birds fight against each other. There's a place in the city where the fighting takes place, but only in winter because in the summer it is too warm and the birds don't fight well. Sometimes the competitions are with money and the winner gets the money. When it is a real good bird, he might make a lot of money and then sells the winning bird, too. We also train them to sing songs. We play the songs for them and they imitate the melodies." (Man, Zahiruddin Camp)

"I have three birds, one here, two in Kabul. My family lives in Kabul. Their songs are good for the brain, an Indian doctor told me. As a neighbor we are friends, so I got to know that they have birds. The private sector is not big enough to provide a market for daily labor. That's why they are busy to catch birds." (Neighbor and customer of birdseller at Kamarband Camp)

3.3.2. Raising Animals for non-Jogis

An aspect that is not reflected in the quantitative survey but has come out strongly through the FGDs and individual interviews, is the praxis of keeping animals for neighbors: in every community examples were found, in which a Jogi family keeps one or several animals (for example cows, sheep, or even a horse) with them and gets paid by the owner to look after it. The owner pays either a monthly amount or pays for the food of the animals until they are slaughtered. In the case of the cows, the Jogi families milk the cows and are allowed to use a portion themselves or sell it to shops. The shops thereby function as interfaces: most people would not buy dairy from the Jogi community directly, because they are not considered as clean or respectful. However, through the shops the consumer does not know where the milk is coming from and the Jogi households can make a small income. However, this arrangement is only found in a couple of households so far, but yields promising prospects to develop it further.

"We used to keep cows for other people, but finances aren't good, we don't have shade and we don't have space/room inside in the winter. Having those animals is a big risk and responsibility. But we know how to make yoghurt and milk cows, how to feed them and keep them." (Man, Zahiruddin)

"There are some families who use cows of others and sell milk and yoghurt to shops. There would be more families who would be interested to do that." (Man, 48 years, Kamarband)



^ Boys threshing grain, Kamarband Camp

The same system can be found in Kamarband Camp with the field in the middle of the community: the Jogi families harvest the wheat that grows on it, bundle it and thresh a part for themselves. For their work they are allowed to keep 20seer per person (1seer=7kg). The landowner takes the rest. Most families decide to thresh the wheat and to bake bread for themselves. Some decide to sell the wheat, which according to some interviewees would give 2000AFA¹⁰⁹ per person.

This illustrates several points:

- The Jogi families who engage in this arrangement have the knowledge and capacity to care for animals and to process wheat

- There are socio-economic ties between Jogi and non-Jogi communities that are so strong that they trust economic resources to remain within the Jogi community
- Shops can be used as interfaces between the producers and the consumers. This minimizes the barrier of buying directly from Jogi communities

These two aspects are worth exploring further for future development projects. Problems that were voiced by the Jogi community concerning these income avenues were the insecurity of land (as trust and neighborly networks depend on stable occupancy and time to get to know each other) and the quality and quantity of the land itself (not having land that can support the animals through growing enough fodder and not enough land to keep more animals).

3.3.3. Buzkashi Involvement

Another relatively unknown aspect of the Jogi community is that some of their men participate in the traditional Afghan sport of Buzkashi. Buzkashi means “goat-grabbing” and denotes a popular sport played in Northern Afghanistan that has become the national sport. It involves riders on horses, called chapandaz, who attempt to gain control of a goat carcass and to carry it across space until a score is accomplished either through dropping the carcass into a circle or in breaking free from the other riders. The number of participating riders may vary between 5 and several hundreds, and can be privately sponsored (qaumi) or publicly celebrated during one of the governmental holidays (rasmi).¹¹⁰

While it is the riders who play the game and the khans who sponsor it, the scored points and prizes are announced by a so-called jorchi or “town-crier”, who shouts the name of the winner and the prize amounts over the heads of the horsemen.¹¹¹ Azoy in his ethnography on buzhashi found a group of Jogi men who participated in buzhashi as jorchis (town-criers) in the 1970s: “As ‘town crier’ (a status he may or may not actually hold in everyday life), he exists at the disposal of anyone who pays for his services. Only a person of, in effect, hopelessly low status (such as a Jugi) would allow himself to be so blatantly in the flattery of others” (Azoy, p.54)

“With little status to lose, he (and later two close relatives) could afford both to sing other men’s praise and to act the buffoon on horseback.” (Azoy, p.39)

“10 or 15 years ago, we had buzhashi players among us. We don’t have animals anymore. At that time, the economy was good and we had the capacity to do this. Now we don’t have it anymore.” (Man, 50 years, Kamarband Camp)

Contrary to other jorchis, who only announced the winner, the jorchis from the Jogi community praised the winners with



^ Jogi Jorchi in the 1970s; Photo: Whitney Azoy

impromptu poems that they improvised on the spot.¹¹² Azoy assumes in his ethnography that the Jogi jorchis were in their position in the buzhashi game because of their general low status that can be described as “outside of the status system”¹¹³. However, Azoy suspects that the position in the buzhashi games resulted from individual initiative and not a traditional place for Jogis within buzhashi.¹¹⁴ Through this individual initiative the first jorchi from the Jogi community created opportunities for his relatives:



^ Jogi Jorchi in the 1970s; Photo: Whitney Azoy

“Habibullah, the Jugi town crier from Kunduz, had himself become a sort of entrepreneur by training both his brother-in-law and his cousin in this specialized role” (Azoy, p.136).

One of the Jogi jorchis who is described in Azoy’s account was recognized in two Jogi camps (Zahiruddin and Kamarband) when a photo of him was shown to interviewees.¹¹⁵



^ Jogi buzkashi rider, Gul Jan

Interestingly though, this survey found that Jogis not only participated as jorchis but also as chapandaz (riders) in buzkashi. While the participation of Jogis as riders in Buzkashi might be limited to individual occurrences, it could either point to a developing dynamic of inclusion of Jogis in the sport that was pre-mediated through other Jogis' participation as jorchis, or it could be mere serendipitous individual cases. However, the very existence of these few cases illustrates that the isolation and strong stigmati-

zation of the Jogi communities can be overcome and individuals can be included in even the most Afghan of all sports.

CASE STUDY, Gul Jan the Jogi chapandaz

Gul Jan lives in a Jogi camp in Mazar-e Sharif. At 52 years of age he is a respected elder in his community and is still partaking in the most Afghan of all sports: buzkashi. He remembers how he started when he was a young boy:

"When I was 12 years old, I used to ride horses and by the time passing I became more professional. The horses belonged to others outside of the community and we were allowed to ride them. There is another boy who also rode and he is now living in the other camp, in Kamarband. About 40 years ago I rode the horse of Asu Parwan. He was a famous man indeed and used to ride horses."

Gul Jan also concedes that it is a demanding pastime:

"It is a pretty hard job, which requires to practice regularly. I had my foot broken. But I am still riding. At certain time there are special occasions like for Newroz [Persian New Year's] celebrations. We gather and celebrate buzkashi for Newroz."

The access to horses, training and the realm of buzkashi is mediated through the owners of the horses, as Gul Jan explains:

"I have some friends who are quite rich, and they give me their horses to ride. But they have their own invitation system, when and whom they invite for providing the horses. So it depends whether I am riding in other places as well. Most of the time they arrange it by cellphone, to contact and visit each other."

3.3.4. Haji Rangin – music unites and divides

Almost all residents in Jogi communities have to fight with social stigmas that express themselves in exclusion from economic opportunities and lack of legal rights. Few like the buzkashi riders and town-criers can bring skill and personal connections to work in their favor to transcend the cage of stigmatization in which the community finds itself. Among the few who straddle this line, is the well-known and recorded musician Haji Rangin¹¹⁶. The tambour player usually lives in Shibergan but was at the time of



^ Haji Rangin in Zahiruddin camp

the research displaced by fighting to Mazar-e Sharif where he sought refuge with relatives in one of the Jogi camps. While his songs are popular and sold on cassettes in music shops, he does not have any financial gain from this distribution:

"I am quite popular. There are some singers with whom I work, like Daud Nazari. With them I play traditional songs. But sometimes I am invited to play on my own. I have been recorded and

there are cassettes of my music out. But I don't get paid for the recording, because for example on weddings they just tape me and I have no rights over the recordings and what they do with them."

While his fame puts him in a prominent and visible position that he could possibly use to lobby for his community, he himself is pessimistic about these prospects as outside support would be narrowly directed towards him personally and not extended towards the community as such:

"There are certain people who want to support me, but I said no, if they are not supporting my family and relatives. There are influential people like the police chief of Shibergan who wanted to help me. But how can I take their help if my family lives like this? When my parents and relatives live in poverty, I cannot go away from them and live a good life all by myself."


At the same time he has experienced himself how limiting his origins in the Jogi community can be:

"Four years ago I was the winner of a music competition and got the possibility to travel to four other countries. It was a free offer. But I could not go because I didn't have a tazkera [Afghan ID card]. I contacted different authorities, even the district leaders signed, but the tazkera department didn't agree to give it to me, so I could not go."

3.5.3. Savings, Loans, Debt

"My wife has kidney stones. I asked an NGO to help me, but they couldn't help me. I took out a loan and send her to Kabul for treatment. The loan was from different people from this camp, 500AFA from one, 100 from another. But there are ten people in my family and I try to feed them as a daily laborer. It's difficult. Now my wife has had an operation in Kabul, but afterwards she developed a new kidney stone and she is suffering and having a hard time." (Man, Zahiruddin II)

Savings




The overwhelming majority of the Jogi households is not able to make any savings (85% in female and 73% in male headed households). Only some (17% and 11% respectively) save less than 500AFA per month¹¹⁷. None of the female-headed households stated to be able to save over 500AFA per month, while only 9% of the male-headed households stated to be able to do so.

This goes hand in hand with the fact that the only group that was able to accumulate any savings was "married living with their spouse". Neither of the divorced, widowed or unmarried respondents lived in a household that was able to make any savings.

In terms of taking loans, Jogi respondents predicted that they would attempt to take a loan from neighbors or family (93% altogether). Family and immediate surrounding community ties predominated compared to other institutional opportunities like banks or moneylenders. Neighbors can be here equated




Where would you go to borrow money?



with community, because the Jogi households live together in endogamous groups. Several interviewees recounted examples of the immediate community pooling money to pay for health care expenses.

A significant number of Jogi households have had a loan in the past. Even more are servicing a debt presently. The reason for taking out a loan is in nearly half of the cases related to paying medical expenses (49%). A quarter of the loans were used to pay for the weddings of sons, while another quarter was due to basic necessities like rent, food, fuel or clothing.

While the amount of debt in the families was negligible (mostly under 12000AFA¹¹⁸ or between 12-30000AFA), most of the respondents were pessimistic about the prospects of paying back the debt. This is a product of their unstable employment situation in which families only earn the bare minimum to survive, which makes them susceptible to economic shocks such as medical emergencies.



"My son died. His kidney was destroyed. I remember blood coming out his nose. We didn't know what was wrong. The doctor said that he needed a new kidney, but we didn't have enough money to pay for the operation. I had a good looking boy, 22 years old. At that time he had two little children and a wife. Now they live with me. They have now left to go and visit her mother. One of the children is 5 years old and one is one year old. I took my son three times to Pakistan, to Peshawar, Rahman medical, and one time to Kabul. I took out 300 000 AFA as a loan, and now I don't know how to pay back. I took the loan from my qawm/community. I don't have any hope to pay back the money." (Woman, 70 years, Zahiruddin II)

3.6. Education

This section outlines the current level of education and current rate of school enrollment of the Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif, in comparison to other urban non-Jogi communities in the same city. The attitude towards education as well as obstacles faced by the Jogi community to join educational institutions are also outlined and evaluated.

Current Level of Education in Jogi Communities

The overall rate of literacy in Afghanistan is 53.5% for urban residents, 68.7% for male urban residents and 37.9% for female urban residents¹¹⁹. The education level for respondents of the household survey in the Jogi communities, however, was significantly lower. Only 13.3% of the male respondents and 1.2% of the female respondents were literate. On the one hand


this shows the notable gender difference in terms of literacy; on the other hand this mirrors the strikingly low literacy rates for nomadic pastoralists with 13.2% literacy among male Kuchis and 1.2% for female Kuchis.¹²⁰

The Jogi community showed slightly higher levels of numeracy (11.4%) than literacy (8.6%), which might be due to the necessity of dealing with numbers on a daily bases in the bazaars or in daily labor jobs that gives some exposure to the handling of numbers and simple math.


Literacy rates and exposure to schooling were measured among direct respondents of the household survey, among household heads and for children and youth in each age category. While 13.3% of the male respondents (and 1.2% of female respondents) stated to be literate themselves, slightly less household

heads were said to have basic literacy (8%). This is a common dynamic also for non-Jogi respondents who tend to claim themselves to be more literate than their household heads (42,9% for non-Jogi respondents compared to 18% of non-Jogi household heads, both in Mazar-e Sharif¹²¹). However, the number of literate household heads among non-Jogi households was still 10% greater than among sampled Jogi households.

Comparison of literacy rates




The findings on literacy correspond with the fact that most of the respondents have never attended school (73,6%). Many respondents reported attending madrassas¹²² (religious seminaries), which made religious education the most prominent form of learning as the highest form of education in households with any kind of exposure to education (14%). In slightly more than 10% of households, who reported exposure to government education, primary school (7,3%) or secondary school (2,8%) was the highest education.




The level of school attendance among the Jogi community is generally low. Overall, only 9% girls and 6% boys at primary school age attend schools. Slightly more attend school between the ages of 10–18 years (26% girls, 10% boys). The greater number of girls attending school might be due to the focus of NGOs such as Skateistan who provide 'Back to School' Programs and have generally helped the community to gain entrance into governmental schools. While offering an equal opportunity strategy Skateistan strongly focuses on bringing Afghan girls into educational programs.

Percentage of children attending schools per age category




Highest education in household



While some children were enrolled in the past couple of years and started to benefit from schools and educational programs, their number is still low compared to the non-Jogi households and among their community. Only 5% of the households had someone who had finished 5 years of schooling and similarly, in only 5% of the households did all school-aged children attend school. Only 8% of the households have a household member who can read and write.

Many respondents had attended madrassa education (29%), over a third of all male respondents have attended madrassa education (42%). Due to the strong historical links to the Taliban movement that emerged from Pakistani and Afghan madrassas in the 1990s, madrassas have in the recent past been sometimes portrayed as 'terrorist dens'¹²³. However, Islamic education has been an important part of the Afghan education system through history and contemporary Afghan madrassas offer religious education at different levels. The time span of attending education in madrassas among respondents ranged from 1 to 16 years.




If someone had attended education at a madrassa, it was on average 4 years long. The low levels of literacy among the direct respondents despite madrassa attendance might be due to a variety of reasons: many madrassas use dated teaching methods focused on memorization combined with leaning in Arabic, a language with which only a few Afghan students are familiar.¹²⁴

"In the mosque close by to our houses we go for Quran lessons. Only on Thursdays on weekly bases we pay 20 AFA, otherwise it's free. I go there together with friends." Boy, 16 years, Kamarband Camp



"I normally go to the mosque to learn Quran. I have never been to school. In a normal day I go to the mosque with my friends and afterwards when I get back to the camp, I play with the other children from our camp." Boy, 13 years, Kamarband Camp

Madrassa education might be the easiest individually attainable solution to the many difficulties Jogi households face in joining educational institutions. The children in the FGDs speak enthusiastically about going daily to the madrassa lessons



and the adults are proud to tell about their children attending. Simultaneously the attendance of Jogi children in the madrassas integrates the households into the local community and attests to their faith. Widely spread stereotypes hold Jogis as non-believers of Islam, a stigma that the Jogi families actively argued against without prompting during the FGDs and individual interviews.

Can at least one household member read and write?



The reasons preventing households from sending their children to school given by the respondents were mainly family poverty (83,6%), working in order to help the family economically (18,2%), and caring for other family members (20,5%). Poverty came up as a main reason as well in the FGDs and the individual interviews:

"Normally in the morning after the morning prayer we go to the mosque to learn Quran. Before we used to study in school, but we didn't have any financial support so we couldn't afford to purchase the uniform and the stationary material, therefore we left the school. Now we go two times to the Quran lessons (morning and after noon prayers)." Boy, 15 years, Kamarband Camp

"Some of our children go to school, but not all. Whenever our children go to school, the parents are worried for the income, because they don't have money/income. If they go to school long, then we have to take them out of school to go to begging or esfandi to get some income for the family." Woman, 30 years, Kamarband Camp

Work as an impediment to school attendance is linked to both poverty and the communities' perception that schools or educational institutions operate on "inappropriate shifts" (7,3%), meaning that the shifts interfere with the times in which the households are out working (daily labor or begging). Without the meager income from begging and daily labor, the households do not have any savings and few social safety nets to fall back onto. They need the work for their daily survival and barely make ends meet. Respondents have voiced that they are very interested in the education of their children and in learning other trades and skills themselves, but would need to do so alongside earning money to feed their families. A flexible shift system with a teacher within the community for either vocational training or for primary/basic education would solve this conundrum and prepare some in the community to take over skill-based jobs other than the ones they are doing right now.

Attitudes Towards Education

The majority of respondents wanted to see more educational opportunities for both the girls and boys in their families. Asked about educational opportunities for themselves such as additional schooling or vocational training, the respondents were more reserved. They were generally open to the idea (47% yes, 13% maybe), but also showed themselves undecided (26%) or unsympathetic to the idea (14%). This might be due to the fact that the respondents' age varied considerably.

Most respondents were unsatisfied (42,7%) or even extremely unsatisfied (7,73%) with the educational situation for their community. Only roughly one tenth of the respondents (12,3%) were satisfied with the current access to education. The relatively high number of respondents who answered that they "don't know" (36,4%) might reflect the communities' lack of exposure to educational institutions per se: how to judge something if you are not partaking in it?


Bullying and Social Exclusion

Another aspect that is entangled with aspects of poverty and social status, and that came out clearly through the FGDs with children and interviews with several mothers, is the social exclusion experienced by the children once they join governmental schools.


From the FGDs it has become clear that the experience of being bullied in school up to the point of physical violence directed against Jogi children because of the stigma of belonging to a Jogi community has supported the individual's or household's decision to take the children out of school.

"I want to study. In the past I used to go to school, but now my friends are not going anymore, so I stopped going as well. I now learn the Quran in the mosque. The main reason that I left school was to find some income and my best friend left school to go for begging, so I left as well. For me being alone in a class as a Jogi was not fair. Sometimes I used to fight with other kids in class. When I was alone in class I had problems with the other kids."


More schooling?



Satisfaction with schooling



Which kind of education would you like to see implemented?



My friends left and I had to fight with the other kids when I was alone. That's why I couldn't stay there." Boy, 13 years, Kamarband Camp

"Most of them were fighting with us. They say, we are Jogis, we don't have a home, we are begging all the time, and they fought with us. And so while we go to different houses, other children say to us: you are worthless, you are jobless, why don't you work? Why do you come all the time for begging? We had to carry a stick with us for protection." Girl, 12 years, Zahiruddin Camp

"Whenever our children are at school other people bully them and make jokes about them, therefore our children don't go for a long time in the same school. That's why we would be interested in a teacher coming to our camp and teaching them here, so they can be surrounded by children of their community and their relatives." Woman, 23 years, Kamarband Camp

"Whenever we send our children to government school, they say that they should not be there, you are Jogi, you should have your own school and you are not part of our community. This makes us feel sad and our children stop going to school." Woman, 45 years, Zahiruddin Camp

"We've been to Skateistan for 6 months. Some of us have been to schools. One to skateistan, one to Ariana Highschool. But because I was bullied, I left the school. I was there for four years. I would like to continue, but because I was bullied and because of other problems I left the school. But overall, I am interested in school." Boy, 14 years, Kamarband Camp

This problem of integrating Jogi children with non-Jogi children was reported by several other NGOs who work with Jogi communities like the Afghan Mobile Mini Circus for Children (MMCC) and Skateistan. However, out-of-school and free-time activities seem to decrease these stereotypes and negative perceptions through contact and exposure of groups of children who would otherwise not meet.



^ Girls laughing, Kamarband camp

"I think that our staff feels very proud to be serving the Jogi communities. They see that these people are really living on the margins of society. I think at first in the Back to School class there may have been some distrust or discomfort - not bullying though, because we have some rules that all the students get introduced to - including that everyone is equal and should be treated equally and we reinforce these and the students do take it seriously." International Employee, Skateistan, Interview

"At the very beginning it was a bit chaotic, because the kids from the camps were not used to get organized in an educational environment. But after a short while they fit in and started to

make friends with other children. The camp projects are the most successful of all our activities, where we work with IDPs, and other groups such as Jogi and Chori Frosh families. Our trainers go frequently into the camps and the camp children come to the circus, where they exchange with other children and show off their skills in the performances, which gives them and their community a feeling of accomplishment and pride." International Employee, Mobile Mini Circus for Children, Interview

"Honestly, first time I saw them and the way they are living, we took masks with us because we were afraid to get sick and we

were not feeling safe. After a few times talking with them, when I came home I thought to myself: 'if we don't do something, who will change their lives?' After a week where I was not feeling relaxed with them, I started to sit with them, listen to their problems and what they need. They are so full of energy, even in the class, they were first noisy and had to learn to be quiet. Now I work with them, they learnt how to respect other's space. We had heard before that they eat human body parts and that they are not Muslim, but now I don't care about any of these things. We see that they are strong in learning Quran and they have a Quran karim. The other children see that we are sitting and eating together, and now they are playing football together. You need to be a role model for the kids." National Staff, Skateistan

While Skateistan targets mainly the children, the MMCC has also instated weekly mother meetings in which the mothers of the children, who participate in circus activities, meet. In these regular visits to the circus school the mothers get together, exchange about concerns over a cup of tea. This community engagement enables especially girls to participate and it strengthens inter-community ties between Jogi and non-Jogi individuals.¹²⁵ In an environment that enables exchange and getting to know each other, stereotypes can be addressed and attenuated.

One of the main obstacles towards schooling in the 2011 report of Samuel Hall was the non-existence of ID cards (tazkeras) and the corresponding inability of Jogi households to register legally. This still played a role in households' difficulty to access education (12,3%). While it is still a present obstacle to accessing education, it was however not so visible anymore due to the engagement of individual NGOs to change the education situation of the Jogi communities in Mazar-e Sharif, notably Skateistan. Skateistan has been successful in bringing first Jogi children into their own "back to school programs" and after completion they have registered Jogi children in government schools.

References to Chapter 3

⁶¹ Barth, Frederik. In: Vermeulen, Hans/Govers/Cora, 1994. The Anthropology of Ethnicity/Beyond 'Ethnic Groups and Boundaries'. Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam. P.12.

⁶² Tajiks are "usually defined as nontribal Persian-speaking Sunni Muslims, [who] constitute about 30 percent of Afghanistan's population", see: Barfield, 2010, p.26.

⁶³ Compared to Samuel Hall Report, p.20.

⁶⁴ Barth, 1994, p.12.

⁶⁵ As compared to the 2011 Samuel Hall report that found 19,6% other dialects or 'secret languages'.

⁶⁶ the population of Kabul has increased from 1.5 million in 2001 to around 6 million in 2014, making it the fifth fastest growing city in the world, see: Ali Karimi. "Can Cities Save Afghanistan?" Foreign Policy, March 2015.

⁶⁷ Central Statistics Organization (2014), National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011-12. Afghanistan Living Condition Survey. Kabul, CSO, key indicators, p.ii. PIN found for Mazar-e Sharif urban residents the average household size of 7.1 household members. Therefore even for Mazar-e Sharif the number is low. See: PIN, Urban Poverty Report, p.35.

⁶⁸ Central Statistics Organization, (accessed: 9-7-2015). Further: "Some 46.1 percent (12millions) are under the age of 15 years, where elderly of 65 and over are around 3.7 percent. The proportion under 15 is among the highest in the world and significantly higher than that of neighboring countries." <http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/Chapter3%20POPULATION%20STRUCTURE%20AND%20CHANGE.pdf>

⁶⁹ Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2013-14, see: [http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/Population\(3\).pdf](http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/Population(3).pdf) (accessed: 9-7-2015).

⁷⁰ Nearly all excludes three responses in which the head of household was either not married, married but not living with the spouse or did not respond to the question.

⁷¹ For similar conclusions on the links between statelessness, land ownership and access to education, see Samuel Hall/UNICEF Report, p.48

⁷² Baseline: Urban Poverty Study, PIN, 2014.

⁷³ Hennion/Nicolle, p.5, p.34; UNHCR Universal Periodic Review: Afghanistan, p.3, 7; UNHCR-Richtlinien zur Feststellung des internationalen Schutzbedarfs Afghanischer Asylsuchender, 2013, p.78; IWPR, ARR Issue 362, 25 May 10; Gesellschaft fuer bedrohte Voelker, Massive Verschlechterung der Menschenrechtssituation in den letzten zwei Jahren, p.2.

⁷⁴ UNHCR, 2005.

⁷⁵ Samuel Hall, p.33. Other reports point to these difficulties as well:

UNHCR Universal Periodic Review: AFGHANISTAN, p.9.

⁷⁶ UNHCR, 2005: See: <http://www.unhcr.org/4497b1c12.pdf>, last accessed: 18.05.2014; 00:41.

⁷⁷ Kueppers, Maira, 2014. Stateless in Afghanistan. In: Forced Migration Review, Issue 46, May 2014, p.9, see: see: <http://www.fmreview.org/en/afghanistan.pdf> (last accessed: 30.07.14 12:54)

⁷⁸ Hennion/Nicolle, p.5.

⁷⁹ TLO/UNHCR report, "An Exploratory Study of Afghan Tazkera Ownership", June 2013, p.13. These numbers stand in comparison with sedentary non-Jogi Afghans, who were found in the same study to have a tazkera in over 85% (men) or 60% (women) depending on the gender of the respondents. IDPs were found to have a somewhat lower rate of tazkera ownership (77,5%). The data, however, was gathered in Kabul and Paghman. (TLO, p.11)

⁸⁰ The respondents were not necessarily the heads of the households. See overview of respondents: Appendix A.

⁸¹ TLO/Tazkera Report, p.16.

⁸² Interviews during 2013/14 research, unpublished thesis, paper forthcoming.

⁸³ Interview with Maira Kueppers, 2.4.2014, who worked on civil documentation research in Afghanistan.

⁸⁴ See: Unofficial translation of "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan", which was ratified by President Hamid Karzai at a ceremony in Kabul on January 26, 2004. See: <http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/page/constitution> (Last accessed: 19.07.2014 22:22). Chapter 2, art. 22.

⁸⁵ The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2004, Chapter 1, art. 4

⁸⁶ The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2004, Chapter 1, art. 16.

⁸⁷ The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2004, Chapter 1, art. 4.

⁸⁸ See: see: <http://www.fmreview.org/en/afghanistan.pdf> (last accessed: 30.07.14 12:54).

⁸⁹ Information from two male FGDs and one female FGD in Kamarband and Zahiruddin.

⁹⁰ See: [http://morr.gov.af/Content/files/National%20IDP%20Policy%20-%20FINAL%20-%20English\(1\).pdf](http://morr.gov.af/Content/files/National%20IDP%20Policy%20-%20FINAL%20-%20English(1).pdf) (last accessed: 28.07.2015 20:06).

⁹¹ Interview with director of Population Registration Department (PRD), 10.06.2015 in Kabul.

⁹² Interview with director of e-tazkera department, 10.06.2015, Kabul.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ See: Samuel Hall, p. 23.

⁹⁵ See: Jon Brain, 2 August 2013: "Afghanistan's first female aeroplane pilot": <http://www.bbc.com/news/worldmiddle-east-23556958>

⁹⁶ See: Moetsabi for UNDP: "Afghan police force recruits women to fight crime and stigma":

<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/womenempowerment/successstories/afghan-women-joinpolice-force/>; Rob Crilly on 14.01.2014: "Afghanistan picks woman for senior police role": <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10572070/Afghanistan-picks-womanfor-senior-police-role.html>

⁹⁷ See: Qayum Babak, 10.04.2014: "Female Cabbies Drive Change in Afghan City" Institute for War and Peace Reporting, ARR Issue 483, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/female-cabbies-drive-change-afghan-city>

⁹⁸ Rao, 1986(b), p.168, and p.172 also: Rao, 1988, p.115.

⁹⁹ See: <http://www.gettyimages.nl/detail/nieuwsfoto's/an-afghan-boy-who-works-the-streets-as-an-espani-a-nieuwsfoto/478371513>

¹⁰⁰ Obaid, Ali. Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN), "Autumn Pastimes, or the Other Fighting Grounds of Afghanistan", 19.December 2013, see: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/autumn-pastimes-or-the-other-fighting-grounds-of-afghanistan/>

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Photo by Centrilivres

¹⁰³ Interview with men in Kamarband, 29.05.2015, in Mazar-e Sharif.

¹⁰⁴ Bird fights have been the target of Taliban attacks though, as in 2013: "Taliban bomb hits bird fight in Afghanistan", 1.02.2013, see: <http://www.news.com.au/world/taliban-bomb-hits-bird-fight-in-afghanistan/story-fndir2ev-1226566350001>

¹⁰⁵ Interview Group of men, 30-45 years, Zahiruddin, June 2015.

¹⁰⁶ With a rate of 1USD=61,5198AFA (4.08.2015, taken from xe.com), 100AFA equal 1.63USD and 10,000AFA equals 162.549USD.

¹⁰⁷ Whitney Azoy shows in his analysis of buzkashi, however, how a game that is portrayed on the surface as mere "shouq/fun," can be exposed as the battleground of powerful political players, see: Azoy, p.9f. While buzkashi has clearly a more exhaustive dimension than bird fights both in participation, audience and national importance, it is indicative that 'shouq' is not always mere fun.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with neighbor of Kamarband 2 Camp.

¹⁰⁹ With a rate of 1USD= 63,65AFA, 2000AFA are 31,42USD (Calculation xe.com, 19.08.2015).

¹¹⁰ On the game itself and its different forms of qarajai and tudabarai, see: Azoy, p.4-10.

¹¹¹ Azoy, p.53.

¹¹² Interview Whitney Azoy, 03.06.2015.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Interview, Whitney Azoy, 03.06.2015: "My guess is that Habibullah invented himself in the role. He then passed some of the work to his brother."

¹¹⁵ Interviewees in Zahiruddin asserted that he now lives in Kabul among their relatives and still works as a jorchi.

¹¹⁶ See a performance by Haji Rangin on youtube "The best bambora by Rangin", uploaded on Oct 13, 2009 by TheYaftali and viewed at the time of writing 166,356 times: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bR3688sntTU>

¹¹⁷ 500 AFA = 7,86USD, exchange rate 1USD = 63,65AFA, xe.com on 19.08.2015.

¹¹⁸ 12.000AFA = 188,53USD and 30.000AFA = 471,33USD with an exchange rate of 1USD=63,65AFA on xe.com, 19.08.2015.

¹¹⁹ National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011 (NRVA 2011), p.78.

¹²⁰ National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011 (NRVA 2011), p.78.

¹²¹ Numbers from Samuel Hall 2014, "A study of Poverty, Food Security and Resilience in Afghan Cities." For DRC and PIN.

¹²² The Arabic word madrassa (Arabic plural: Madaris) "generally has two meanings: (1) in its more common literal and colloquial usage, it simply means "school"; (2) in its secondary meaning, a madrasa is an educational institution offering instruction in Islamic subjects including, but not limited to, the Quran, the sayings (hadith) of the Prophet Muhammad, jurisprudence (fiqh), and law. Historically, madrasas were distinguished as institutions of higher studies and existed in contrast to more rudimentary schools called kuttab that taught only the Quran" See: Blanchard, CRS Report, "Islamic Religious Schools", 2008. See: <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21654.pdf>

¹²³ Borchrevink, Kaja; Harpviken, Kristian Berg. 2010. "Teaching Religion, Taming Rebellion? Religious Education Reform in Afghanistan", Prio Policy Brief, See: http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4685~v~Teaching_Religion_Taming_Rebellion__Religious_Education_Reform_in_Afghanistan.pdf

¹²⁴ See: Borchrevink/Harpviken, 2010, p. 2.

¹²⁵ These camp activities, however, are so far only implemented in Kabul by the MMCC. The infrastructure however exists in Mazar-e Sharif as well to implement activities in Jogi and IDP camps.



4. Resilience Index

This section shows an overview and comparison with some of the findings of PIN's 2014 Urban Poverty Report¹²⁶. Several aspects that find its expression in the here presented resilience score have been discussed in other sections of the report (see: education, WASH, access to electricity, etc). Others, like the Food Consumption Score (FCS), the Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS), and the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) will be discussed here separately before looking at all combined factors in the resilience score.

Food Consumption Score (FCS) and Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS)

The Food Consumption Score (FCS) is a composite score based on dietary diversity, food frequency, and relative nutritional importance of different food groups. Food items are grouped into standard food groups with a maximum value of 7 days/week. The consumption frequency of each food group is multiplied by an assigned weight that is based on its nutrient content.¹²⁷ Those values are then summed obtaining the Food Consumption Score (FCS). Categories were defined based on the classification established by the FSAC with a FCS below 28 considered to be poor, between 28.1 and 42 borderline and above 42 acceptable.¹²⁸

PIN's 2014 Urban Poverty Report found that "20% ($\pm 2\%$) of urban Afghans suffer from poor food consumption, while a further third are borderline, leaving less than half with acceptable levels of consumption, despite the fact that the survey was conducted post-harvest"¹²⁹ and "Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat present the higher proportions of households with poor food consumption with respectively 31% and 25% of households reporting poor levels of food consumption in both these cities"¹³⁰. However, even compared with the general FSC Score for Mazar-e Sharif, the Jogi community still looks miserable when it comes to food consumption. 90% of all surveyed Jogi households had levels of poor food consumption compared to 31% in all over Mazar, and only 2% of all Jogi households showed acceptable food consumption. This means that within an environment that is already



considered as one of the worst in Afghanistan's cities when it comes to dietary balance, the Jogi fair worse than anyone else.

A similar dynamic can be found when looking specifically at the dietary diversity of Jogi households and the general score for Mazar-e Sharif. The Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS)


provides an additional way to assess the quality of diets based on the diversity of food components that households consume. The HDDS records all the food consumed by a household over the past 24 hours before the interview per food group. The HDDS supports the findings of the FCS, showing that the non-Jogi households seem to consume both less and less diversified food items with mainly cereals and bread and very low rates of vegetables and fruit.

Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS)

While the FCS and HDDS measure the consumed food items within a week or the preceding 24 hours, the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) collects information on the subjective views of food security situation. The scale ranges from low (worrying about food access) to high (not eating) and takes the frequency of these occurrences into account. It shows whether households experienced anxiety related to accessing food in the previous month and if they reduced the quantity and quality of their food.¹³¹ The Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) is based on the principle that "the experience of food insecurity causes predictable reactions and responses that can be captured and quantified"¹³².

Two thirds of the surveyed Jogi households in Mazar-e Sharif can be categorized as severely food insecure (77%), while only 13% of the households feel that their access to food is regular and secure. The female-headed households showed stronger anxiety about their access to food with levels over 10% higher on the feeling of severe food insecurity (81,5% in female headed households compared to 67,9% in male headed households).

While many Mazar residents in the Urban Poverty Study of 2014 felt severely insecure about their stable access to food (47%), many more Jogis felt anxiety about their ability to provide for themselves and their families, which results from the actual experience of household members deciding not to eat on a regular bases.





Resilience Score

The overall resilience score was initially developed by FAO and then adapted to the Afghan context by PIN. It looks at five areas, namely food security, access to basic services, asset ownership, access to social services and the adaptive capacity of a household. These key variables were combined to create a resilience score based on cut-off points adapted to the Afghan context.

Food security is measured in the scores presented above (FCS, HDDS, HFIAS). Another dimension such as the access to basic services assesses access to education, electricity, water sources and latrines, to health practitioners and ID card ownership. The category of assets gauges housing arrangements, land ownership, ownership of livestock other durable assets. Social Services evaluates both the communities' past access to assistance of national and international NGOs as well as the capacity to make use of personal networks. The adaptive capacity of a household is measured through looking at the multiple sources

of income, household spending, debt levels, levels of education and health-related issues such as drug addiction and disability among the household members.

While PIN's Urban poverty report showed that poverty is prevalent in all major Afghan cities,¹³³ the Jogi community fares worse in almost all key indicators compared to other Mazar residents. While the Jogi communities' adaptive capacity is nearly level with other non-Jogi Mazar residents, they have much more difficulties in accessing basic services, own far less assets and are severely insecure on all scores pertaining to access to food. The only dimension in which Jogi communities fare better than non-Jogi communities, are "social services," which on the one hand reflects past contact to aid agencies and on the other the capacity to mobilize support from personal networks. The Jogi community is internally relatively strong in its networking capacity: they live geographically close together in camps and households and, for example, pool money to help each other access basic services like health care. Simultaneously, most of the households have been in touch with either PIN or Skateistan due to involvement in their programs. The result is similar when looking at the Jogi community in comparison to other displaced populations (conflict IDPs and returnees) or economic migrants. In nearly all other counts, however, the Jogi communities fare worse.



References to Chapter 3

- ¹²⁶ Urban Poverty Report/ A Study of Poverty, Food Insecurity and Resilience in Afghan Cities. Samuel Hall for PIN, 2014, See: http://drc.dk/fileadmin/uploads/pdf/IA_PDF/Afghanistan/DRC_PIN_Urban_Poverty_Report.compressed.pdf
- ¹²⁷ See Weighing of the list of food items in Annex B.
- ¹²⁸ FSAC, (2013), Seasonal Food Security Security Assessment – Afghanistan (July-September 2013), p.15 and p.36. In: PIN, Urban Poverty Report, p.37.
- ¹²⁹ Urban Poverty Report, p.36.
- ¹³⁰ Ibid, p.37.
- ¹³¹ FAO (2008), Report on Use of the HFIAS and HDDS in two survey rounds in Manica and Sofala Provinces, Mozambique. p. 3.
- ¹³² Coates, J., Swindale, A., Bilinsky, P. (2007) Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) for Measurement of Household Food Access Indicator Guide (v.3). Washington, DC : FHI 360/FANTA. p. 1
- ¹³³ Urban Poverty Report, p.46.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Socio-Economically:

While the Jogis largely subsist on despised, non-producing occupations (begging and day labor), there are other avenues of income generation that some families have begun to pursue, which simultaneously bring more stability to monthly income and support the development of a positive relationship between Jogi and non-Jogi segments of the community:

Support new income opportunities

Existing strategies among certain families - like animal husbandry for hire, involving the care of animals for non-Jogi households where Jogis receive a nominal stipend in addition to using dairy for themselves or selling it through a shop interface, offer potential alternatives to socially marginalizing and unstable income generating strategies like begging. This already happens in some families, but many more families involved in this study expressed interest in accessing this form of economic activity. What they lacked was the financial means and/or the land access required to start it. Such activities, which already exist in the Jogi knowledge-base, represent an under-exploited resource for NGOs not only in terms of expanding Jogi livelihoods but also as a means of improving ties with non-Jogi communities.

Vocational Trainings in Off-Hours

Some adults in the Jogi community were interested in learning other trades or skills, but found it difficult to attend any classes or vocational trainings that would impede with their current work as beggars or daily laborers. The need to keep the men and women in the workforce to provide at least the bare minimum for the survival of their families was expressed as crucial, because even then they still faced problems in providing for their families (see precarious situation in food access scale). If additional vocational trainings could be given, then it would have to be matched with what normal offices would consider as off-hours (evenings and weekend days such as a Friday). These vocational

trainings could be especially crucial for the adolescents who are too old to join educational programs but still considered young enough to learn a trade or new skills.

Legal Status

The legal status of Jogis is complicated, yet gives reason for hope. Some Jogis seem to be able to obtain tazkeras - a key aspect of legal recognition - based on improving access to bureaucratic interfaces and the increasing acceptance of Jogi applications for tazkeras in Kabul and Kunduz. This progress is likely due to an appeal to the presidency by AIHRC two years ago and a „positive response“ by former president Karzai, according to an AIHRC representative who spoke with the author. However, a combination of lack of communication between government offices and uneven distribution of information among the community itself compounded by existing social stigmas, still prevents most Jogis from obtaining tazkeras.

Recognition

The issue of legal recognition is one that must be addressed by Afghan civil society. Jogi integration into the Afghan national context is no longer a question of debate: while they may have arrived in the country in the range of 200 years ago, they no longer engage in cross-border migration and themselves express a desire to integrate into Afghan society.

Community Support in Claiming Rights

Too often, Jogis themselves are unaware of the rights to which they are entitled under Afghan law. Support of the community in claiming those rights, particularly in obtaining tazkeras legally, is a key element of community empowerment. Spreading awareness and supporting the community through the process of obtaining tazkeras through counseling, mentoring and technical support would go a long way in helping the community formalize its place in Afghan society.

Inclusion in E-Tazkera Rollout

As Afghanistan begins to transition over to an electronic system of national identification, it will be important to ensure Jogis are included in the initial and subsequent roll-outs of the e-tazkera. Already a system has been developed to target the IDP population in Kabul and make the arduous process of obtaining the e-tazkera easier for them. A marginalized community like the Jogi, who have on some levels strikingly similar socio-political needs compared to IDPs, can benefit by being included in this process.

Nomadic to Sedentary Transition

The Jogi interviewed in this study have expressed a desire to transition from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle. It is the responsibility of the state to ensure they are able to do so. None of the Jogi households covered in this study own any land, a factor which, they say, impacts every other level of their life. The ever-present threat of expulsion severely curtails the families' future aspirations. As a socially marginal group, the individual households benefit from carefully nurtured social ties to neighbors and surrounding communities - ties that are severed each time the households are forced to abandon their home base for good. While some households benefit from seasonal movement, they nevertheless return to the places they consider their homes and use the existing infrastructure they have developed there, including permanent structures like houses and stables.

Support in negotiating Long-Term Leases

Stability of home will play a long-lasting and transformative role in the lives of the Jogi. Lobbying for long-term lease contracts for the communities to settle in a certain area will have a domino-effect on other aspects of the community's overall health, as well as socio-economic and educational opportunities.

Education

While the overall education and literacy situation is alarming, some minor successes resulting from NGO interventions suggest all hope is not lost. Some Jogi children have joined schools with the help of organizations like Skateistan. Additionally, at least anecdotally, it appears that possessing a tazkera is sufficient for Jogi children to access educational institutions. But major obstacles remain, including economic pressures, which force Jogi children into begging rather than attending school. Even for those few Jogi who have managed to overcome these kinds of barriers, one of the major difficulties they face is deeply entrenched social stigma. The FGDs have shown, for instance, that some Jogi families have taken their children out of school after excessive bullying or physical abuse by non-Jogi children.

Anti-Bullying

Based on interviews with Jogi children and their mothers, excessive bullying directed against the Jogi communities in particular appears to be a key factor in keeping many children away from attending schools. Mitigating the effects of bullying, whether through mentoring programs targeting Jogi children themselves, or broader awareness programs in schools dealing with the negative impacts of bullying (including workshops for teachers) would go a long way in keeping Jogi children in schools once they join.

Mobile Teachers

Until the broader economic dimensions of the Jogi community are addressed, it would be helpful to send individual teachers into the camps themselves who work on flexible schedules (evenings, Fridays, etc) that can be adjusted to accommodate the times children spend contributing to the family's economic needs. While not ideal, this can act as a stop-gap strategy, simultaneously providing some degree of education while not interfering with what many Jogi say is a key component of their economic survival.

Social Stigma

Social status, particularly in a network-based society like Afghanistan, plays a central role in the health of any community. The Jogi suffer severely from their marginal status in Afghan society, a position that underlies many of their other economic and legal problems.

Inter-community Exchange and Interaction

Much of the social stigma that surrounds the Jogi community is based on myths that perpetuate in an environment of non-interaction with other communities. The obvious way to overcome this is to facilitate cross-community activities between Jogi and non-Jogi children. This has multiple trickle-down effects, which programs like Skateistan and the Afghan Mobile Mini Circus for Children (who have worked in camps in Kabul as well with Jogis) have shown. Targeting children has the benefit of bringing not only the children themselves, but also the parents together in a safe and cooperative environment where adults for example can connect through the shared roll of parenthood.

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Annex A – Respondent Profiles

Table 1 – Respondents of Household Survey

Gender	Camp (Area name)			Grand Total
	Zahiruddin	Kamarband	Qali Hajeri	
female	16	67	2	85
male	26	96	13	135
Grand Total	42	163	15	220

Table 2 – Marriage Status of Respondents

Gender	divorced	married living with spouse	married not living with spouse	no response	not married	widow	Total
female	1	65	0	0	4	15	85
male	0	129	1	1	4	0	135
Total	1	194	1	1	8	15	220

Table 3 – Respondents' Position in Household

Gender	Head of household him/herself	Parent of household head	Son or daughter	Son or daughter of spouse	Spouse	Total
female	24	1	4	1	55	85
male	124	0	5	2	3	134
Not answered	0	0	1	0	0	1
Total	148	1	10	3	58	220

Annex B – Explanation of Indices

Food Consumption Score

The FCS is a “proxy indicators to measure caloric intake and diet quality at household level, giving an indication of food security of the household. It is a composite score based on dietary diversity, food frequency, and relative nutritional importance of different food groups.”⁷⁶ The FCS was calculated based on the food groups, weighting system and cut-off points used by the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSaC) for their food security assessment conducted in 2013. The weights applied for each food group were as follows:

Food Group	Weight
Cereals and Tubers	2
Pulses	3
Vegetables	1
Fruit	1
Meat, Fish and eggs	4
Dairy products	4
Sugar, sweets	0,5
Oil, fat	0,5
Condiments, spices	0

To calculate the FCS, and based on the FSaC methodology, the research team:

1. Used standard 7-day food frequency data. as cereals and tubers were surveyed as different food groups, the higher number of days either cereals or tubers were consumed was chosen. This differs from the FSaC’s formula but only leading to statistically insignificant variations in the results of the survey.
2. Multiplied the values obtained for each food group by its weight and created new weighted food group scores.
3. Summed the weighed food group scores, thus, creating the food consumption score (FCS). The most diversified and best consumption with maximal FCS at 112 means that all food groups are eaten 7 days a week.

The research used the FSaC’s thresholds : a FCS below 28 means a poor food consumption, a FCS between 28.1 and 42 a borderline food consumption, a FCS above 42 an acceptable food consumption. These three categories were used to calculate the percentage of households of poor, borderline and acceptable food consumption.

Food Consumption Indicator

Percentage of food expenditure in total household expenditure. The thresholds and categories were based on the Food Security Cluster assessment. In Afghanistan:

- Poor: Food expenditure is more than 60 percent of total household expenditure;
- Average: food expenditure is at 40-60 percent of total household expenditure;
- Good: food expenditure is less than 40 percent of total household expenditure.

Coping Strategy Index

The CSI used for the study was also based on the methodology developed by the FSaC, as follows :

The CSI (more accurately, it is RCSI: Reduced Coping Strategy Index) is used to quantify the severity of food-based coping strategies. a 7 days recall period is used. It is based on a number of robust negative coping strategies and applies a standard weight depending on the severity of the coping strategy. It is very useful for comparing across regions and countries, or across income/livelihood groups, because it focuses on a set of behaviours. The maximal CSI is when all strategies are applied every day. There are no universal thresholds for RCSI. The weighted score is calculated by multiplying the frequency by the weight. but the higher the RCSI, the more severely the coping is applied by a household, hence the more food insecure the household is.

The weight are as follows :

Coping Strategy	Weight
<i>Rely on less preferred and less expensive foods</i>	1
<i>Borrow food or rely on help from friends or relatives</i>	2
<i>Limit portion size at mealtime</i>	1
<i>Restrict consumption by adults in order for small children to eat</i>	3
<i>Reduce number of meals eaten in a day</i>	1

Household Dietary Diversity

24-hour recall period

For a greater precision, additional data was collected to measure the dietary diversity of households over the past 24 hours. The score per household is calculated by coding either “1” if the food has been consumed or “0” if it has not and adding up the result for each food group. The HDDS indicator is the sum of all HDDS divided by the number of households.

7 days recall period

Based on the NRVa, the research team calculated a household dietary diversity score based on a 7-day recall period. This gives a) the average number of days per week each food group is consumed by different sub-groups of the sample; b) a score between 0 and 10 calculated for each household based on whether they consumed each of the various food groups over the past seven days.

Durable Asset Index

The durable asset ownership index is created by assigning weights to the various commodities asked for in Q33 of the household questionnaire. The index scores the ownership level on a scale of 0-100 where 0 being no assets in possession and 100 being all assets. The weights are assigned based on the cost of the various items and their ability to support the family in terms

of livelihood or other comforts. The following weights are used for the commodities and then summed across all commodities:

Asset	Weight
<i>Fridge</i>	10
<i>Stove</i>	10
<i>TV</i>	10
<i>Radio</i>	5
<i>VRC</i>	5
<i>Mobile</i>	5
<i>Computer</i>	10
<i>Sewing</i>	5
<i>Iron</i>	5
<i>Bicycle</i>	5
<i>Motorcycle</i>	5
<i>Car</i>	10
<i>Tractor</i>	15

The categories were defined as follows:

- Category 1 – High assets Ownership: 50–100
- Category 2 – Moderate asset Ownership: 25–45
- Category 3 – low asset ownership: 5–20
- Category 4 – No asset Ownership: 0